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Terrorism and Money Laundering:
Illegal Purposes and Activities'
Victoria B. Bjorklund
Jennifer I. Reynoso
Abbey Hazlett 2
"The independent commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks said the
U.S. government hasn't made much progress in figuring out how al Qaeda
gets its financing.... Most... comes from wealthy individuals in the
Persian Gulf and corrupt Islamic charities, the panel said ....
I. Introduction
A significant number of U.S. charitable organizations and donors
generally seek to serve individuals and organizations situated beyond our
borders. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, however, regulators
and the media have focused on the fact that overseas giving, like all
cross-border transactions, may potentially be diverted for terrorism and
money laundering. Executive and legislative actions taken after
September 11 specifically prohibit providing support for terrorism or
organizations and individuals associated with terrorism. In addition, in
2002, the U.S. Treasury Department issued "Anti-Terrorist Financing
Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities,"4 which
are intended to provide practices which may reduce the risks that a
charity's funds will be diverted to terrorist purposes.
1. Copyright © 2004 Victoria B. Bjorklund. This paper was first presented by
Victoria B. Bjorklund on October 28, 2004 at a conference of the National Center on
Philanthropy and the Law entitled "Diversions of Charitable Assets: Crimes and
Punishments." With the exception of a few minor citation changes, this paper has been
adopted as first presented at the National Center on Philanthropy and the Law conference.
2. The authors are, respectively, Partner, Associate, and Summer Associate in the
Exempt Organizations Group at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP.
3. Glen R. Simpson, Terror-Fund Countermeasures Ripped, THE WALL ST. J, Aug.
23, 2004, at B2.
4. United States Department of the Treasury, U.S. Department of the Treasury Anti-
Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities,
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/tocc.pdf (last visited Apr. 12,
2005).
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It is our perception that, if such diversions have been undertaken by
U.S. donors or charities (rather than by donors or charities organized
outside the U.S.), the activities have been hidden and not well known to
the charitable sector. Of course, we agree that any diversion is anathema
and to be avoided. But, since this activity is beyond the experience of
almost all U.S. charities and donors, at least to their knowledge, we
believe that a good starting point might be to examine where and how
diversions have been alleged to have occurred. This paper, therefore, is
our attempt to "connect the dots" on terrorism and money laundering
involving U.S. charities, donors and their advisors and to determine
whether there are any suspicious patterns of which charities, their
directors, and donors should be made aware.
To inform ourselves, we reviewed charges brought by the U.S.
federal government after September 11, 2001, against U.S. charities and
charity-associated individuals. To do so, we reviewed dozens of news
reports on allegations of terrorist links. We have also reviewed reports
issued by the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering and by
the independent commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks (the "9/11
Commission").
In closing, we reflect on what may be some of the "red flags" we
consider most important in our anecdotal experience and how we think
U.S. charities and donors can best protect the use to which their gifts are
put.
II. Investigations and Charges
Between May 18 and August 2, 2004, we reviewed dozens of
newspaper reports on U.S. charities, charity-related individuals, and non-
U.S. charities and alleged terrorist links and diversion of funds. We
sought to determine if and how any of those charities and individuals
were alleged to be linked. We attach as Exhibit A a chart entitled
"Summaries of Articles," which includes articles and certain Department
of Justice Press Releases and 9/11 Commission testimony, which were
the basis for our Exhibits B and C. We attach as Exhibit B a chart
entitled "Alleged Connections between Charitable Organizations and
Terrorists as of August 2, 2004." Finally, we attach as Exhibit C a chart
entitled "Indictments Against Alleged Terrorists Allegedly Connected to
Charitable Organizations."
These materials 'suggest to us a point that we make repeatedly:
ideologically-driven individuals will use any tools - including real or
contrived charities - to advance their activities. But the variety of
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alleged fundraising and money-laundering schemes involving charities
do not appear to fall into patterns from which lessons might easily be
drawn.
III. The Illinois Charities Case Study
After we completed our Exhibits A-C, we reviewed Chapter 6, "The
Illinois Charities Case Study," of the Terrorist Financings Staff
Monograph released in late August 2004 by the 9/11 Commission Staff
(attached as Exhibit D) (the "Case Study"). The Case Study analyzes the
U.S. federal government's pre- and post- 9/11 investigations of two
Illinois-based charities, Global Relief Foundation ("GRF") and
Benevolence International Foundation ("BIF").
We provide a summary of facts compiled from the Case Study,
which we reviewed to determine whether any patterns or red flags were
present that could or should have been visible to donors, directors, or
others:
GRF was incorporated in Bridgeview, Illinois in 1992. GRF
described itself as an organization that provided humanitarian relief to
Muslims through overseas offices, primarily in strife-tom regions such as
Bosnia, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Chechya. GRF began
operating with $700,000 in cash. By 2000, it reported more than $5
million in annual contributions. According to its filings with the Internal
Revenue Service (the "IRS"), GRF sent 90 percent of its donations
abroad between 1994 and 2000. GRF's overseas offices received their
own contributions in addition to what they received from the U.S.
organization. According to the government, GRF's founders had
previously been affiliated with the Mektab al Khidmat ("MAK"), which
was co-founded by Abdulla Azzam and Usama Bin Ladin in the 1980s to
recruit and support mujahideen to fight against the Soviets in
Afghanistan. MAK funneled money and fighters to the mujahideen and
set up a network of recruiting offices around the world, including in the
U.S. One offshoot of MAK in the U.S. was the Al Khifa Refugee Center
in Brooklyn. A number of persons convicted in the first World Trade
Center bombing were associated with the Refugee Center, including
Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, who is currently serving a life sentence for
his role in a plan to bomb New York City tunnels and landmarks.
MAK/AI Khifa was designated a specially designated global terrorist
("SDGT") on September 23, 2001. The FBI suspected the Executive
Director of GRF of being a supporter of the Egyptian extremist group Al
Gama'a Islamiyya ("AGAI"), which was affiliated with Sheikh Omar
2005]
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Abdel Rahman, and of having connections to Usama Bin Ladin. The
FBI also believed that GRF support to terrorists took the form of
purchase and shipment of large quantities of sophisticated
communications equipment, provision of humanitarian cover
documentation to suspected terrorists, and fundraising for terrorist
groups under the cover of humanitarian relief. Bank records revealed
large transfers of funds to GRF overseas offices. The FBI believed GRF
distributed the bulk of funds as humanitarian relief, but also supported
armed militants in certain regions. In addition, two days before
September 11, 2001, two of the hijackers dropped off bags containing
fruit, clothing, flight logs, and other materials at a mosque in Maryland.
The imam at the mosque worked part-time raising money for GRF. The
FBI ultimately concluded that the imam had no role in supporting the
9/11 attacks, although it considered him to be a supporter of and fund-
raiser of the international jihadist movement. The FBI believed GRF had
two types of donors: those who thought they were giving money for
humanitarian relief and those who gave money to support jihad.
In October 2002, the Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC")
designated GRF a SDGT pursuant to Executive Order 13224. GRF
failed in its efforts to challenge OFAC's initial asset blocking in court.
GRF has continued to litigate the issue of whether sufficient evidence
existed to justify its designation as a SDGT. As of August 2004, the
litigation is pending in federal district court in Chicago. As of August
2004, the government had not filed criminal charges against GRF or its
leadership and, according to the Case Study, such charges are
"increasingly unlikely." A GRF fundraiser was deported to his native
Lebanon in July 2003.
BIF was incorporated in Illinois in March 1992. BIF described
itself as an organization devoted to relieving the suffering of Muslims
around the world. According to its IRS filings, it received more than $15
million in donations between 1995 and 2000. At the time it was
founded, BIF's three directors were Sheikh Adel Abdul Jalil Batterjee
and two other Saudis. The Shiekh was also a founder of Lajnat Al-Birr
Al-Islami ("LBI") in Jeddah, which provided support to the mujahideen
fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, as well as humanitarian aid to
refugees of that war. In March 1993, the original directors were replaced
by three new directors, including Enaam Arnaout, who became the
executive director. The U.S. government contended that the change was
made after Batterjee came under scrutiny in Saudi Arabia for financially
supporting jihad outside of approved channels. The government
[Vol. 25:233
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contended that Arnaout was a longtime jihadist supporter, with personal
ties to Usama Bin Ladin, and that he provided support to the mujahideen
in the 1980s and 1990s as an employee of LBI and another Saudi charity.
Amaout married an American citizen, and he became a naturalized U.S.
citizen in March 1994. According to news articles, Batterjee continued
to oversee operations from behind the scenes, with Amaout keeping him
apprised of BIF's activities. In addition, news articles reported that
Arnaout instructed BIF's employees not to offer outsiders information
about Batterjee.
In March 2002, the FBI provided Bosnian officials with enough
evidence to gain legal authority to conduct a criminal search of BIF's
offices in Bosnia. The search yielded compelling evidence of links
between BIF's leaders and Usama Bin Ladin and other al Qaeda leaders,
and many documents on al Qaeda. In January 2003, Arnaout was
charged with one count each of racketeering conspiracy under RICO,
conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, providing material
support to terrorists, conspiracy to launder money and wire fraud, and
two counts of mail fraud. The indictment itself contained almost no
specific allegations that BIF funded al Qaeda. Instead, the charges
focused primarily on BIF's diversion of charitable donations to fund
Chechen and Bosnian fighters. The government contended that BIF
fraudulently solicited and obtained donations by falsely representing that
the funds would be used solely for humanitarian purposes. According to
statements of Gary Bald, Assistant Director, FBI, before the Senate
Judiciary Committee on May 5, 2004, Arnaout admitted that donors to
BIF were misled into believing that their donations would support
peaceful causes. These funds from unwitting donors were than
commingled with funds from donors who were aware that BIF was
providing support to militant groups, in order to avoid scrutiny.
In November 2002, OFAC designated BIF an SDGT pursuant to
Executive Order 13224. BIF's challenge to the asset blocking was
stayed until the criminal case was resolved and was eventually
dismissed. BIF did not challenge its OFAC designation as an SDGT. In
the criminal case, Amaout pled guilty to one count of racketeering
conspiracy for fraudulent diversion of charitable donations in the amount
of $315,624 to promote overseas combatants, including boots for fighters
and uniforms for a provisional but unrecognized government in
Chechnya, and boots, tents, and uniforms for soldiers in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The court sentenced Arnaout to more than 11 years in
prison but rejected the government's request that it apply the sentencing
2005]
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enhancement for crimes of terrorism. 5
The case study presents important "Lessons," including:
" "The agents and officials in these cases faced one of the
most important and difficult issues in the fight against al
Qaeda and jihadist fund-raising: there is a difference
between troubling 'links' to terrorists and compelling
evidence of supporting terrorists.... [H]ow much
information does the government need before it can take
action against a potential terrorist fund-raiser?"
" "Both of these organizations raised large amounts of money
in the United States, which they sent overseas, often to or
through people with jihadist connections. When the money
went overseas, it became virtually untraceable, since it
could be converted to cash and sent anywhere in the world."
" "But there is another side to the story. Despite these
troubling links, the investigation of BIF and GRF revealed
little compelling evidence that either of these charities
actually provided financial support to al Qaeda - at least
after al Qaeda was designated a foreign terrorist
organization in 1999."
* "...[D]espite unprecedented access to the U.S. and foreign
record of those organizations, one of the world's most
experienced and best terrorist prosecutors has not been able
to make any criminal charges against GRF and resolved the
case against BIF without a conviction for support of
terrorism... [I]n BIF and GRF, the total political will,
prosecutional and investigative talent, and resources of the
U.S. government have so far failed to secure a single
terrorist-related conviction.",
6
5. As recounted in the Case Study, counsel for BIF and GRF expressed great
frustration with the OFAC process, including "the blocking of assets without any
adversarial process adjudicating culpability, their view that the process lacked defined
standards, their perception of OFAC's unresponsiveness to attorney inquiries and
licensing requests, the use of classified evidence unavailable to the defense, and OFAC's
reliance on evidence that would not be admissible in a judicial proceeding." Infra,
Exhibit D. OFAC stated in response that the courts have upheld the process and
standards it uses in designations, as well as the use of classified information, news
articles, and other hearsay in support of the designations. Id.
6. JOHN ROTH ET AL., NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES: MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING 110-113 (2004), available at
http://www.9-I lcommission.gov/staffstatements/911TerrFinMonograph.pdf A portion
of this work is reproduced infra Exhibit D.
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The Case Study does not suggest steps the charities, their boards, or
their donors could or should have taken to prevent the diversion of funds.
In both cases, it seems clear that high-ranking employees and boards
members purposefully deceived donors and knowingly supplied funds
for non-charitable activities. As the investigations of these charities were
not disclosed until after September 11, 2001, the public at large had no
way of knowing that these individuals were suspected of supporting
terrorism or individuals associated with terrorism.
IV. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
A. Background
The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering ("FATF")
was founded in 1989 at a G-7 Summit in response to increasing concern
over international money laundering.7 FATF was charged with the task
of studying money laundering trends, surveying national and
international action with regard to the problem, and making
recommendations on what further action should be taken. In 1990,
FATF issued its first report, Forty Recommendations, which provided a
framework for combating money laundering. Forty Recommendations
was most recently updated in 2003.8
FATF currently has thirty-three members, including countries,
territories and organizations. 9 Most notably for the purposes of this
paper, membership includes the United States and the Co-operation
Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC).10 The GCC is comprised
of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates. In addition, other international organizations have the status of
"observer" of the FATF and several regional bodies exist which have
parallel functions as the FATF. Membership in the FATF and the
regional organizations often overlaps.
7. FATF, About the FATF, available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/document/63/0,
2340,en_32250379_32236836_34432255-1-._ll1,00.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
8. Id.
9. FATF, Members & Observers, available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/pages/
0,2966, en_32250379_3223686911 _l,00.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
10. Id.
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B. Response to Terrorism
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the FATF met in
Washington D.C. in October 2001 to issue special recommendations to
address terrorist funding. The Special Recommendations on Terrorist
Financing include a recommendation on terrorists' abuse of charities.
The recommendation states:
Countries should review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to
entities that can be abused for the financing of terrorism. Charities are
particularly vulnerable, and countries should ensure that they cannot be
misused:
(i) by terrorist organisations posing as legitimate entities;
(ii) to exploit legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financing,
including for the purpose of escaping asset freezing measures; and
(iii) to conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion of funds intended for
legitimate purposes to terrorist organisations.II
In 2002 the FATF supplemented the recommendation regarding
charities with a report entitled Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit
Organisations: International Best Practices.12 The report outlined three
suggested areas where preventative measures should be focused: (1)
Financial Transparency, (2) Programmatic Verification, and (3)
Administration.
The "Financial Transparency" best practices emphasize "the
importance of risk and size-based proportionality in setting the
appropriate level of rules and oversight" in the area of financial
transparency.' 3  With that caution in mind, the report suggests
organizations maintain and be able to produce program budgets, conduct
independent audits, maintain registered bank accounts where all funds
are kept, and use formal financial institutions to transfer money.
With regard to "Programmatic Verification," the report recommends
that charities should be in the position to "know and... verify that funds
have been spent as advertised and planned." Specifically, the report
11. FATF, FATF Annual Report 2001-2002, available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/I 3/1/34328160.pdf (June 21, 2002).
12. FATF, Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations: International Best
Practices, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/39/19/34033761.pdf (Oct. 11,
2002).
13. Id. at 2-3.
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recommends that charities should tell donors the purpose of their
donation, gather information to help ensure funds reach the intended
beneficiary, conduct field examinations considering "risk-based
proportionality," and coordinate oversight and encourage information
exchange when dealing with beneficiaries outside of the charity's home
jurisdiction.1 4
Finally, under "Administration," the FATF recommends that
charities carefully document all staff and policies that affect oversee
operations. In addition, the FATF places heavy emphasis on the
importance of an active Board of Directors, particularly with respect to
due diligence to guarantee the charity is operating ethically. The
recommendations state that "[f]ack of knowledge or passive involvement
in the charity's affairs does not absolve a director.. .of responsibility."15
C. FATF 2003-2004 Typologies
16
In 2004, the FATF released its Report on Money Laundering and
Terrorist Financing Typologies. The report identified typologies for
money-laundering activities under the guise of charity. Within the
typologies, there are three broad categories of charity abuse and
additional subcategories within the broad categories.
1. Raising Funds Through Charities
The typologies identified two subcategories within the larger
category of raising funds through charities. The first subcategory is the
use of charities by terrorist organizations for broad-based formal
fundraising. In this circumstance, the organization often follows the
formal process of filing for and gaining tax-exempt status. Such
organizations use aggressive fundraising tactics and solicit the public at
large or specific religious and ethnic groups. The Report states that
under UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), a number of
charities have had their assets frozen because terrorists have used the
organizations for fundraising.
The second subcategory is the use of informal cash collections to
14. Id. at 3-4.
15. Id. at 4.
16. FATF, Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2003-2004, at 7-10, available
at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/19/11/33624379.PDF (last visited Apr. 12, 2005). A
typology is a study or systematic classification of types that have characteristics or traits
in common.
20051
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raise money for terrorists. The cash donations can be collected and then
redirected to terrorist groups. Solicitation is mainly targeted at particular
religious or ethnic groups. Cash collections can also by used as a method
of money laundering by integrating the proceeds of terrorist criminal
activities into the "legal financial system."
2. Transferring Funds Through Charities to Terrorists
The typologies also identified two subcategories within the larger
category of transferring funds through charities to terrorists. First, in
some cases, charities are organized in a legal form to avoid regulation
and monitoring of money transfers. The typologies provided the
example of cultural associations established by indigenous ethnic
communities. Once the associations are organized, they collect money
and transfer money across national borders, but this activity does not
raise red flags because it is considered in the normal course of operations
of the association.
A second example is the establishment of multiple related charities
in different countries but within a particular ethnic community. Money
can then be transferred between the charities using the organizations'
accounts to make payments. Again the money transfers are considered in
the course of ordinary course of operations of the charity and, therefore,
do not automatically raise red flags. In some cases, the FATF reported
that diversion schemes were detected because the charities were handling
much larger amounts of money than expected given their location in low-
income areas. Additionally, other organizations were investigated
because they were handling amounts of money that seemed in excess of
their stated purpose and activities.
3. Charity is a Direct Cover of Terrorist Organization
Finally, the typologies identified the use of charities as direct covers
for terrorist organizations. In these circumstances the charity provides a
cover for the terrorist operation and supplies direct financial and
logistical support to terrorists and terrorist organizations.
D. FA TF 2003-2004 Red Flags
In addition to identifying terrorist financing typologies, the FATF's
[Vol. 25:233
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2004 report identified "red flag" behavior derived from the typologies. "
The "red flags" are behaviors that might serve as markers of potential
illegal behavior. The report identifies the "red flags" as potentially
helpful to financial institutions and supervisory or investigative
authorities. Boards of Directors should also be aware of these "red
flags." However, it would be difficult for the average donor to be aware
of such activity.
The "red flags" include specific financial characteristics that might
indicate illicit behavior, including:
(1) discrepancies between apparent sources of income and the
amount of funds;
(2) discrepancies between the size and pattern of financial activity
and the stated purpose of the organization;
(3) sudden upswings in the size and frequency of financial
transactions, or funds are held in accounts for a prolonged period of time;
(4) large, unexplained cash transactions; and
(5) the absence of contributions to the charity from donors within
the organization's home jurisdiction.
The report also outlined other characteristics that should be
considered "red flags," including:
(1) charities with foreign directors in combination with large money
transactions to the home countries of the directors;
(2) large numbers of charities that are inexplicably connected with
common addresses, personnel, or "gatekeepers;"
(3) charities with no clear purpose and sparse infrastructure; and
(4) transactions with persons in "high-risk" jurisdictions.
V. Conclusion
A. Criminal Motivation
In analyzing this information, we concluded that the situations
where terrorism funding and money laundering are most likely to occur
are those where the actors are criminally motivated and intend to defraud
donors. We understand from the FATF reports that there are instances of
cooperating donors but we want to believe that most of those instances
occurred outside the U.S. The information we reviewed showed that the
17. Id. at 10-11.
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actors are idealogically driven men. This is not surprising as extremists
of all sorts believe that the ends justify the means. Thus, whether the
actor is Enaam Arnaout (who pled guilty to one count of racketeering
conspiracy for fraudulent diversion of charitable donations to promote
overseas combatants, largely sending anti-mine boots and tents to Bosnia
and Chechnya) or Colonel Oliver North (who was convicted of using
foundation grants to purchase arms in the Iran-Contra scandal and is now
a right-wing media personality with many admirers), idealogically-driven
individuals appear most likely to cross the line into criminal behavior
using charities.
We are also aware that churches, temples, and mosques may make
ideal covers for the criminally motivated because "churches" do not file
Forms 1023 and 990 with the IRS and frequently receive cash donations.
Nonetheless, to date, allegations have been made more often against
charities than against houses of worship or religious denominations. Is
that because activities of religious extremists are harder to track? Or is it
because religious organizations are less susceptible than other kinds of
charities? We have seen no study anywhere on this question, although
we have seen the question asked by others.
B. Due Diligence
After reviewing all of the cases of alleged diversion for terrorist
purposes, we are aware of none that involve a diversion of funds granted
by a U.S. grantmaker to a foreign recipient organization ("FRO"), where
the diversion would have been uncovered but for the lack of appropriate
due diligence and oversight procedures. Reasonable belief that an FRO
is engaged in illegal purposes or activities, in our experience, typically
arises in the course of the questions that are part of the due diligence that
U.S. public charities and private foundations have done for decades. In
particular, we have personally seen several instances where the financial
reports coming back to the U.S. charity did not appropriately account for
the expenditure of some portion of granted funds. In each case, when
challenged, the FRO could not provide satisfactory documentation or
explanation of the funds' use. In each such case which we worked on,
the U.S. charity demanded and received restoration of the diverted funds.
(In none of these cases were funds diverted to terrorism or money
laundering by the FRO.) But these cases, in our experience, are also very
small in number compared with the very large number of grants made
each year. This experience suggests to us that the diligence procedures
long used by U.S. funders and operating charities can be very effective.
[Vol. 25:233
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This is especially true where the FROs want to receive future
contributions. Other helpful ways to "get to know the FRO" include site
visits by staff or a contractor and references from others who have
worked with the FRO.
C. Summary
Our review showed us that there are more reports of alleged links to
terrorism by U.S. individuals and organizations than we had anticipated.
But, as the 9/11 Commission and its staff pointed out, "links" to terrorist-
sympathizers fall far short of the evidence needed to convict individuals
for supporting terrorists. In addition, few, if any, of these "links" alleged
that U.S. charities were unwittingly being used to support terrorist
activities. Therefore, we found and think that there will likely be few
convictions of U.S.-based charities for terrorism. Instead, individual
convictions will likely be based on something other than support of
terrorism, such as tax or immigration fraud.
This leads us to ask, "Why haven't we seen more allegations of
diversion of charitable assets for money laundering and supporting
terrorism in the U.S.?" We think that many factors contribute:
" A long history in the U.S. of defining what is and is not
charitable activity;
" A system, even if imperfect, of federal, state, local, press,
donor and watchdog efforts to criticize improper behavior
by organization managers;
" Increased transparency through wire transfers, internet
research, and information posting and reporting;
" The success of best-practices and due-diligence procedures,
including
o having a written grant-award agreement,
o having references for a new grantee,
o asking for reports back, and then reviewing them,
o asking questions when reports are inadequate, and
o demanding restoration of funds in appropriate
cases, and
" Good use of common sense, in particular using a risk-based
approach under which the highest-risk grants or gifts enjoy
a higher level of pre- and post-grant scrutiny. In that
connection, we commend attention to Exhibit E, the
"Continuum of Risk Factors" chart submitted to the IRS on
2005]
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July 14, 2003, by individual members of the ABA Tax
Section Committee on Exempt Organizations.
In closing, we note that only law-enforcement authorities can punish
criminally motivated individuals who misuse charities for money
laundering or terrorism and only law-enforcement authorities have the
tools to really root out bad actors. Enforcement will be the topic of a
later panel at this meeting; therefore, we do not address enforcement
solutions in this paper. That having been said, we believe that the rest of
us can make diversions less likely by continuing to use and promote
practical risk-based diligence procedures. In that connection, we
continue to call attention to tools like the chart at Exhibit E as the kind of
practical guide based on years of experience that, we believe, needs to
become more widely known and used in the sector.
Exhibits
A: Summaries of Articles
B: Chart of Alleged Connections between Nonprofit Organizations
and Terrorists as of August 2, 2004
C: Indictments Against Alleged Terrorists Allegedly Connected to
Charitable Organizations
D: Chapter 6, Terrorist Financing Staff Monograph, "The Illinois
Charities Case Study"
E: Excerpt from Comments of Members of the ABA Tax Section
Committee on Exempt Organizations, July 18, 2003, "Table 1:
Continuum of Risk Factors."
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Exhibit A
Summaries of Articles
Source
Washington Post, March
5, 2003, Christopher Lee,
U.S. Says Yemeni Cleric
Aided al Qaeda; Man
Boasted of Giving bin
Laden $20 Million Before
Sept. 11, Officials Say, at
page A09
New York Times, May 12,
2004, William Glaberson,
Judge Vacates Guilty Plea
in Yemeni Case, at B01
~1-
Al Farouq Mosque
" Mohammed Ali Hassan Moayad was arrested on
January 10, 2003 in Germany with his assistant
Mohammed Mohsen Yahya Zayed.
" They were arrested after FBI informants lured
them to a hotel with the promise of donating $2
million to buy weapons and communication equip-
ment and fund mujaheddin fighters' training.
" Hassan Moayad had "bragged" about personally
delivering $20 million to bin Laden in the years
before September 11th including money that was
collected at Al Farouq Mosque in Brooklyn.
" Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, who was later con-
victed of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing
used to gather supporters at Al Farouq Mosque.
* Abad Elfgeeh, owner of Carnival French Ice
Cream in Brooklyn, was arrested in connection with
terrorist financing.
* Elfgeeh was charged with unlicensed money trans-
mitting and conspiracy, but NOT terrorism and pled
guilty to the charges.
* On May 11, 2004 Judge Sifton vacated the plea
stating Elfgeeh did not understand the charges.
* Charges against several people in Brooklyn have
"skirted claims of direct ties to terrorism and
instead have involved violations of financial laws or
charges of making false statements".
* Elfgeeh has acknowledged being a hawala for
acquaintances and was recorded stating he trans-
mitted money to Hassan Moayad: Prosecutors
allege Elfgeeh sent $21 million overseas from his
accounts between 1997 and 2003.
" Hassan Moayad was extradited from Germany to
Brooklyn to stand trial
" Ahmed Elfgeeh, Abad's brother, has also been
tied to Hassan Moayad and Hassan Moayad
described Ahmed as his "most committed fund-
raiser" in the U.S. There are no charges against
Ahmed Elfgeeh and he moved to Yemen 3 years
ago.
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The Record, July 10,
2004, Bergen Man Gets 5
Years for Lying to FBI;
Accused Helped Sheik
Who Reportedly Raised
Money for bin Laden, at
A06
The Associated Press,
July 9, 2004, Michael
Weissenstein, Stiff Sen-
tence for Gas Station
Owner Who Lied in Ter-
rorism Probe
Washington Post, Janu-
ary 23, 2004, John Mintz,
U.S., Saudi Arabia Fet-
tering Charity Linked to
Terrorism, at page A17.
Al Farouq Mosque
" Numan Maflahi was convicted & sentenced to 5
years in prison for lying to FBI agents about his
relationship with Sheik Abdullah Satar (a Yemeni
sheik) who prosecutors allege raised money for al
Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.
" Maflahi arranged speaking engagements for Satar
at mosques in Brooklyn and Manhattan, drove him
to the engagements and helped collect the money
for the Charitable Society for Social Welfare (pur-
ported to be a charity for orphans).
" Charitable Society for Social Welfare has not been
designated as a terrorist organization.
* The U.S. federal government stated the charity was
a front for radical Muslim groups and was rerouted
to bin Laden and al Qaeda.
" Malflahi was first investigated because of the
investigation into Mohamed al-Moayad-one of
AI-Moayad's associates in Brooklyn, Abad
Elfgeeh, told an informant that Satar (a prominent
politician in Yemen) could take money easily out of
the United States because he has a diplomatic pass-
port.
" Satar also met with one of al Qaeda's top officials
in Italy in 1999.
" Same article as The Record, July 10, 2004
" U.S. and Saudi governments announced joint effort
to crack down on Al-Haramain branches in Paki-
stan, Indonesia, Kenya, and Tanzania-alleging
that the branches funnel money, arms and person-
nel to al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.
Declassified document said the organization in the 4
countries: was a major financier of terrorists in
Indonesia; a Tanzanian employee helped plan the
1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa; and a
Kenyan employee planned assassinations of U.S.
officials.
" U.S. and Saudi governments asked the U.N. to des-
ignate the branches as terrorist organizations.
" The indictment of Sami Omar al-Hussayen
alleged that he provided internet support to Al-
Haramain's branches in Somalia and Bosnia. Those
branches had previously been designated as terror-
ist organizations.
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Washington Post, Febru-
ary 20, 2004, John Mintz,
U.S. Freezes Accounts of
Large Saudi Charity, at
page A02.
-I.
Al Farouq Mosque
" U.S. Treasury ordered the accounts of the Oregon
and Missouri branches of Al-Haramain frozen.
* Pete Seda (aka Pirouz Sedaghaty) founded the
Oregon branch in 1997. He is now under investiga-
tion along with Soliman Albuthe, who helped run
the organization. The investigation into Seda and
Albuthe centers on the transfer of large traveler's
checks across U.S. borders.
" A mosque in Springfield, Missouri was established
by Al-Haramain. Kamran Bokhari was one of the
top leaders of the mosque and the U.S. representa-
tive to al-Mujahiroun, a radical London group that
supports al Qaeda.
" Al-Haramain's chief, Aqeel AI-Aqeel, was fired by
Saudi officials because of suspicion about his role
with the charity.
New York Times, June 2, * Saudi Arabia dissolved Al-Haramain, along with
2004, Saudis Tighten other Saudi charities, and is folding their financial
Grip Over Charities. assets into a national commission.
9 The U.S. and Saudi Arabia asked the U.N. to add
the Netherlands, Albania, Afghanistan, Bangladesh
and Ethiopia branches of Al-Haramain to the list of
designated terrorist organizations.
- The U.S. blocked the assets of the five above
branches of A1-Haramain.
e U.S. blocked Aqeel Abdulaziz AI-Aqil's assets.
Associated Press Online,
June 6, 2004, Matthew
Rosenberg, Al-Qaeda Con-
tinues to Siphon Chari-
ties, at International
News.
**good source on the day
to day activity of Al-
Haramain, particularly in
Africa**
" Provides examples of al Qaeda siphoning charity
money to fund operations.
" Reports that A-Haramain money was diverted to
help fund the bombings in Kenya, Tanzania, and
Indonesia; bombing of Israeli hotel in Kenya.
" "U.S. officials have privately conceded that only a
small percentage of the total" was diverted and that
few of those who worked for Al-Haramain knew
money was being funneled to Osama bin Laden's
terrorist organization.
* Saudis (under heavy pressure from the U.S.) moved
to dissolve Al-Haramain on June 2, 2004. A com-
mission was created to filter all money in Al-
Haramain's coffers and direct it towards interna-
tional charity.
" U.S. believes that A-Haramain offices are still oper-
ating in Kenya, but under new names after having
moved funds to new bank accounts. A former
employee of Al-Haramain stated that he knew of at
least 2 Islamic preachers who are still receiving sal-
aries from Al-Haramain.
" In Somalia, Al-Haramain is running a school, an
internet caf6, and a money transfer business.
" "[A U.S. intelligence official] said many Islamic
charities that have been ordered shut down [and]
are being investigated for terrorist ties are reopen-
ing under new names or staying open in areas
where there is no government crackdown. 'Al-
Haramain is doing both.'"
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e U.S. Treasury official Juan Zarate stated "Certain
individuals associated with Al-Haramain were using
the charity itself to support terrorist groups from a
logistical and philosophical standpoint. . .co-
mingling funds and co-mingling activities that meld
the good work with bad work."
* In certain countries (e.g., Pakistan, Indonesia) dona-
tions to A-Haramain were advertised as a form of
jihad although it was not specifically stated that the
money would be used to fund terrorism. In other
countries, Funds were more surreptitiously raised
Associated Press World- * Sami Omar A1-Hussayen was acquitted on June
stream, June 10, 2004, 10, 2004 of 3 terrorism counts, one count of making
Bob Fick, Saudi Graduate a false statement, and two counts of visa fraud; the
Student Cleared of Ter- jury could not reach verdicts on three counts of false
rorism Charges News; NY statement and five counts of visa fraud.
Times, June 11, 2004, No e Accused of using computers to assist Al-Haramain
Conviction for Student in and Islamic Assembly of North America (LANA).
Terror Case, at page 14. The websites he created/operated were allegedly
used to recruit terrorists, raise money, and dissemi-
nate inflammatory rhetoric.
Associated Press World- e Bosnia shut down Al-Haramain, Al Furqan, Al
stream, June 25, 2004, Masjed Al-Aqsa Charity Foundation, and Taibah
George Jahn, U.S., Euro- International in May 2004. There is no record
pean Intelligence Agencies where the money went that was collected ostensibly
Use Rewards, Informants for Muslim poor.
in Covert Hunt for Ter- * More than a dozen such charities have been shut
rorists in Bosnia down since 2001. It is estimated that three such
charities collected nearly $20 million between 2001
and 2003 [in Bosnia?].
The Oregonian, June 4, * U.S. federal government announced it was moving
2004, Beth Quinn, Ash- to designate the Qur'an Foundation founded by
land Friends Defend Pete Seda as a supporter of terrorism.
Muslim, at page A01 9 Seda has not been charged with a crime. However
he, along with his organization, were placed on an
FBI "watch list" in 2002.
e Seda now lives in Saudi Arabia.
* Seda's supporters say he has been swept up in the
allegations about Muslim charities following Sep-
tember llth and the Patriot Act, causing him to
lose his business, charity and home in America.
The Associated Press, * Discusses the U.S. federal government's post-acquit-
June 18, 2004, Bob Fick, tal strategy with regard to Sami Omar AI-Hus-
Feds Still Unsure About sayen and the impact going forward on other
Retrial, Experts Say pending trials and investigations.
Clash Will Continue.
The Boston Globe, June e Discusses the interplay between the Patriot Act and
28, 2004, Harvey A. the First Amendment in Sami Omar AI-Hus-
Silvergate, Free Speech in sayen's trial.
an Age of Terror, at page
All
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The Associated Press, * The U.S. federal government dropped remaining
June 30, 2004, Bob Fick, immigration charges against Sami Omar AI-Hus-
No Immigration Charges sayen in exchange for him agreeing not to appeal
for Idaho Student. his deportation.
Los Angeles Times, July - Sami Omar A1-Hussayen was released from jail
22, 2004, Nation in Brief and deported to Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Acquitted in Terror
Case is Deported, at page
14
Source Benevolence International Foundation
Chicago Tribune, Febru-
ary 22, 2004, Sam Roe,
Laurie Cohen and Ste-
phen Franklin, How
Saudi Wealth Fueled Holy
War; Charity Leader
Funded Fighters to
Spread and Defend Islam,
at page 1
o Benevolence International was started by Adel Bat-
terjee with the assistance of Enaam Arnaout.
Alleged to have originally aided war refugees in
Afghanistan, but began to help train, house and
transport Muslim fighters.
" Batterjee and other Saudi charities received chari-
table funds from King Saud, members of the royal
family, Saudi millionaires, and average Saudis
(most of whom donated for religious reasons).
" Batterjee opened a fundraising office for Benevo-
lence in Chicago in 1992. In 1993 Batterjee
stepped down as a director because he was under
increasing scrutiny in Saudi Arabia, and Arnaout
was placed in charge of the U.S. office.
" Benevolence's public literature stated it was a relief
group, but an internal memo stated "from its first
day [Benevolence] aimed to support jihad and
mujahadeen". Another memo stated the mission
was to "make Islam supreme on this Earth".
" Arnaout left the U.S. in November 2001 to go to
Bosnia because a manager at Benevolence in Bosnia
was concerned about investigations. About half of
the charity's activities were not "on the books".
Arnaout's home was raided by the FBI, and Benev-
olence's assets were frozen once he left.
" Arnaout returned to the U.S., and his home in Bos-
nia was raided by Bosnian officials.
" On April 30, 2002, Arnaout was arrested, and
accused of funneling charity money to al Qaeda and
other armed groups. Batterjee was named as an
un-indicted co-conspirator. Mohammed Jamal
Khalifa (linked to the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing) was also linked to Benevolence because a
call was made from the organization to a phone
number "associated" with Khalifa.
" Judge in charge of the case indicated the evidence
was not solid linking Benevolence to terrorism. The
FBI made a deal with Arnaout.
" Arnaout pled guilty to racketeering, admitting that
he defrauded donors of almost $316,000 by diverting
the money to Bosnian and Chechnyan fighters in
return for the terrorism charge being dropped.
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The Miami Herald, June * Adham Amin Hassoun, who helped launch Benev-
30, 2004, Jay Weaver, olence International Foundation, has been indicted
Padilla could be charged in Miami on gun possession, perjury, and obstruc-
in Miami, at page 1. tion of justice charges in an attempt to promote
global fihad. The article does not specify whether
those charges are in any way related to Hassoun's
activity with Benevolence International.
* Hassoun is now being linked to Jose Padilla.
Source Charity Without Borders
WFOR-CBS News, May * Adam Gadahn, designated by the U.S. as a person
28, 2004, Ben Fox, availa- of interest suspected of having connections to al
ble at www.cbs4.com Qaeda. Gadahn worked for Charity without Borders
in 1997 in Garden Grove, California.
* Terror suspect Khalil al-Deek also worked for
Charity without Borders. Al-Deek is suspected of
having ties to Usama bin Laden.
Email from Betsy Adler, * Charity Without Borders was suspended by the Cal-
dated May 28, 2004, cit- ifornia Franchise Tax Board (FTB) on March 1,
ing Cal. Secretary of 2004.
State website
OC Weekly, June 18, * Charity without Borders was operated out of Khalil
2004, Nick Shou, Hide & al-Deek's apartment in Anaheim, California. The
Go Deek, at page 10. stated purpose of the charity was to "educate, feed,
clothe and shelter anyone in any country that is in
need of our help."
* Terrorism commentator, Steven Emerson, has
implied that funds from the charity were used to
fund terrorism.
Source Global Relief Foundation
Copley News Service, * Omar Abdi Mohamed, president of the Western
June 25, 2004, Kelly Somali Relief Agency is indicted for immigration
Thornton Copley, Refer- crimes and taking $5,000 from Al-Haramain (charge
ences stay in indictment added in March)-Mohamed is NOT indicted for
terrorism.
* The indictment accuses Mohamed of taking
$351,000 from Global Relief Foundation and lying
about it during a 2002 citizenship interview.
9 Judge Houston (S.D. Cal.) refused to remove refer-
ences to "terrorism" from the indictment despite
arguments that it would prejudice the jury.
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Department of Justice 9 Four men were indicted in connection with Help the
Press Release, February Needy in Syracuse, New York: Rafil Dhafir,
26, 2003 Maher Zagha, Ayman Jarwan, Osameh Al
Wahaidy.
* Charged with conspiring to transfer funds to Iraq in
violation of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, and Dhafir and Zagha are charged
with money laundering and conspiracy to commit
money laundering.
* Indictment alleges: (1) between 1994 and the time
of the indictment the men conspired to transfer
funds and other economic resources to Iraq; (2)
solicited funds from people in the United States
using the name "Help the Needy", deposited the
money in New York banks, and then laundered the
money to Iraq, totaling $2.7 million.
The Associated Press, e Prosecutors are alleging Help the Needy raised
June 17, 2004, William nearly $5 million from 1994 to 2003, with at least
Kates, Lawyer. Isaho $160,000 ending up in Iraq.
Aquittal Bodes Well for * Dhafir has not been charged with terrorism, but he
Jailed Muslim Doctor. is still being investigated for possible connections to
terrorism. The indictment alleges twelve counts of
money laundering, one count of conspiracy to com-
mit money laundering, defrauding Medicare of
$274,000, and evading federal income taxes by writ-
ing off the illegal charity donations totaling
$400,000.
* Dhafir was born in Iraq-has been denied bail four
times and is being held pending trial.
* Help the Needy sent checks totaling $42,000 to
Global Relief Foundation and to Benevolence Inter-
national Foundation
Source Holy Land Foundation
Associated Press, June * Ghassan Elashi, Bayan Elashi, Basman Elashi,
10, 2004, David Koenig, Hazim Elashi, and Ihsan Elashi (five brothers)
Men Accused of Hamas stood trial in June on charges they shipped com-
Ties to Go on Trial puters to countries that help terrorists.
* The charges include: illegal exports to Libya and
Syria, making false statements on export declara-
tions, and money laundering and about activities of
the brothers with their company InfoCom.
* The trial is considered a warm up to a trial in Fall
'04 on charges the brothers used their computer
business to launder money ($100,000) to the leader
of Hamas.
e Ghassan Elashi was the chairman of Holy Land
Foundation: the charity allegedly gave money to
the wives and children of Palestinian suicide bomb-
ers.
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The Washington Times, * The brothers were the executives of InfoCom and
June 12, 2004, High were accused of knowing they violated export rules
Aynesworth, Trial begins and made false statements on export documents.
for five Palestinians; * There were no terrorism charges at issue in the
Brothers accused of trial, but during a second trial later in 2004, the 5
exporting contraband to brothers will face charges that they funneled money
terror-linked nations, at to Hamas that was used to benefit the families of
page A02 known terrorists.
Los Angeles Times, July * "[Tihe three-week-long trial [of the Elashi brothers]
2, 2004, Scott Gold, Quiet is wrapping up with considerably less fanfare than
End to Mislim Brothers' the case began with, leading to renewed accusations
Trial; Once accused of that President Bush's war on terror often targets
being 'terrorist money- domestic politics as much as international terror-
men,' the five await a ver- ism."
dict in an export case. * Terrorism charges that were dropped from this first
Critics call it an overzeal- trial and are now scheduled for the trial in the Fall.
ous prosecution, at page * The brothers have been linked to Mousa Abu
A15 Marzook, a leader of Hamas; Marzook allegedly
gave money to the Holy Land Foundation.
No charges have ever been filed against the broth-
ers in connection with the Holy Land Foundation
although the charity was shut down in 2001 and
alleged to be a front for terrorism.
Associated Press, July 7, * The Elashi brothers were convicted by a federal
2004, David Koenig, Ver- jury, but not all brothers were convicted of all
dict reached in export case charges.
The Dallas Morning * Contains a time line of Holy Land Foundation from
News, July 8, 2004, Holy the founding of Holy Land Foundation in California
Land and InfoCom's His- in 1989 to the conviction of the Elashi brothers.
tory, at page 18A
The New York Sun, July * Officers with the Holy Land Foundation were
28, 2004, Eli Lake, A indicted on charges that they funneled $12.4 million
Muslim Fund Sent to Hamas between 1995 and 2001.
Millions to Terrorists at o "Mr. Ashcroft said the indictments were made possi-
page 1 ble by new powers granted the federal government
by the USA Patriot Act."-BUT the actual indict-
ments were brought under the 1995 International
Emergency Economic Powers Act and the 1996
Anti-Terrorism & Effective Death Penalty provi-
sions.
o Indictments were against: (1) Shukri Abu
Baker-founder of the organization; (2) Ghassan
Elashi-founder of the organization; (3) Moham-
med El-Mezain-founder of the organization (4)
Haitham Maghawri-official; (5) Akram Mishal-
official; (6) Mufld Abdulqater-official; (7)
Abdulraham Odeh-official.
o Charges included money laundering, providing
material support to terrorists, making financial
transactions that threatened national security, and
filing fake tax returns.
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* Indictment charges that Holy Land Foundation paid
for Islamic fundamentalists to travel to America.
* At an October 1993 meeting, Baker and Elashi
discussed hiding fundraising activities for Hamas by
.masquerading" as a charity and giving "token"
amounts to non-Islamic charities. Baker is quoted
in the indictment as saying "We can give $100,000
to the Islamists and $5,000 to the others."
The New York Times, * Shukri Abu Baker-former president and chief
July 28, 2004, Eric executive of Holy Land
Lichtblau, Arrests Tie * Ghasssan Elashi-former board chairman and
Charity Group to treasurer
Palestinian Terrorists at * Mufid Abdulqader-top fundraiser
page 10. * Mohammed E1-Mezain-former chairman of the
board
& Abdulraham Odeh-Holy Land's representative in
New Jersey
* Haitham Maghawri-former official
a Akram Mishal-former official
* Maghawri and Mishal were able to leave the coun-
try before they were arrested, but they were
indicted.
The Houston Chronicle, * Holy Land was once the nation's largest Muslim
July 28, 2004, Thomas charity. The charity was closed by executive order
Korosec, Texas Charity in December 2001.
Helped Terrorists, at page
1.
Statement of the Attorney e Sami Amin A1-Arian and 7 co-conspirators were
General re: Indictments, indicted on February 20, 2003-4 of those indicted
February 20, 2003 were in the United States (Sameeh Hanunoudeh,
Hatim Naji Fariz, and Ghassan Zayed Ballut).
e Charges include: racketeering, conspiring to provide
material support for terrorism, conspiracy within the
U.S. to kill and main people abroad, conspiring to
violate emergency economic sanctions, extortion, per-
jury, obstruction, immigration fraud.
e AI-Arian was the American leader of Palestinian
Islamic Jihad.
* AI-Arian was born in Kuwait, but lived in the U.S.
since he came here for college (over 25 years ago);
was a professor at the University of South Florida's
College of Engineering.
CBS News.com, January - Fawaz Mohammed Damrah (aka Fawaz Damra)
13, 2004, Cleveland was indicted on December 10, 2003 and arrested on
Islamic Leader Indicted, January 13, 2004.
available at * Charges include: unlawfully obtaining U.S. citizen-
www.cbsnews.com ship by providing false or fraudulent information-
Damrah allegedly concealed connections to groups
that committed terrorist acts against Jews when he
applied for U.S. citizenship (he became a U.S. citi-
zen in 1994).
2005]
23
PACE LAWREVIEW
Source Holy Land Foundation
* Terrorist groups Damrah is allegedly connected to:
Islamic Center of Cleveland (the city's largest
mosque), Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Afghan Refu-
gees Services, Inc (aka Al-Kifah Refugee Center),
Islamic Committee for Palestine (aka Islamic Con-
cern Project).
* After September l1th, Damrah represented the
Muslim community at interfaith gatherings, then a
news station broadcast a video of Damrah in 1991
making anti-Jewish comments at a Chicago gather-
ing: "he called for rifles to be directed at Jewish
people and referr[ed] to them as 'the sons of
monkeys and pigs'".
Testimony before the
House Financial Services
Subcommittee on Over-
sight & Investigations,
March 11, 2003, Testi-
mony by Steven Emerson,
Director of the Investiga-
tive Project
**detail discussing the
connections between Al-
Arian and terrorism**
" A1-Arian (leading his 7 co-conspirators) financed,
coordinated and assisted acts of terror by "secretly
establish[ing] cells or sections of the PIJ in different
countries, and in the United States [by utilizing]
the structure, facilities and academic environment
of the University of South Florida to conceal the
activities of the PIJ".
" AI-Arian established the Islamic Committee for
Palestine in Tampa, Florida-the described mission
of the group was as a humanitarian group that pro-
vided aid to Palestinians.
" The government alleges the Islamic Committee for
Palestine was a front for Palestine Islamic Jihad.
" An Islamic Committee for Palestine-sponsored event
in 1990 in Chicago had one speaker who described
terrorist attacks cared out by Islamic Jihad in Pal-
estine and then solicited money stating: "We are
giving you a list of 16 martyrs. Some of these died
in amphibious operations. Some died in assault
operations. The families need your assistance.
Each martyr needs $1000 dollars. Is there someone
here to sponsor ten martyrs?"
* Annual conventions and conferences were organized
in various other U.S. cities by ICP-according to the
government the meetings: (1) brought into the U.S.
leaders of militant Islamic terrorist groups, (2)
raised money for jihad charities and other front
organizations and tax exempt foundations, (3) pro-
vided a platform for overt and covert calls and plans
to commit terrorist attacks.
" Islamic Committee also published and distributed a
newsletter "Islam and Palestine" that carried
"Islamic Jihad communiquds" and interviews with
jihad leaders.
" AI-Arian also was the administrative director of
World and Islam Studies Enterprise ("WISE"),
which was affiliated with the University of South
Florida-the described purpose of the group was to
serve as a "think tank on Islamic thought and polit-
ics".
* The government alleges WISE was a front for Pal-
estine Islamic Jihad
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* WISE and the University of South Florida had a
full working relationship: the university co-hosted
forums with WISE, trained WISE-sponsored gradu-
ate students, shared the university's resources and
libraries.
The Associated Press, o Fawaz Damra trial in progress.
June 15, 2004, Joe * Damra was the former imam of Al-Farouq Mosque
Milicia, Prosecutors say in Brooklyn. Al-Farouq was located in the same
Islamic Cleric Raised building as Afghan Refugee Services.
Money for Terrorist * Afghan Refugee Services and Islamic Committee are
Groups as Citizenship classified as terrorist organizations by the U.S. fed-
Trial Begins. eral government.
Plain Dealer, June 16, 9 Fawaz Damra is accused of raising between
2004, John Caniglia, Ter- $10,000 and $15,000 at a 1991 fund-raiser in Cleve-
ror-Link Trial Begins for land which went to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Local Islamic Cleric, at through Sami A1-Arian.
page B4
Akron Beacon Journal, * Fawaz Damrah was convicted by a jury on June
June 18, 2004, Stephen 17, 2004. He will be sentenced on September 9,
Dyer, Cleric's Conviction 2004 and could lose his citizenship and be sen-
Called Win vs. Terror; tenced to a maximum of five years in jail.
Cleveland-Area Muslim * Government presented video of Damrah "spewing
Leader Could Get Prison. hatred toward Israel and Jews" and fundraising for
Jury in Akron Decides He the Islamic Committee for Palestine; also argued he
Lied to Become Citizen, at was the "closer" for an "economic jihad" conducted
page A01 by Islamic Terrorists; a document was also produced
listing Damrah as the director of Afghan Refugees
Service.
Associated Press, June * Documents filed in court on June 18, 2004 stated
19, 2004, Court papers Fawaz Damrah was a fundraiser for Sami Al-
accuse imam of wanting Arian and plotted to launder money to Islamic
to launder money for vio- Committee for Palestine.
lent Islamic group o In a recorded conversation between Damrah and
AI-Arian, Damrah talks about raising $35,000 in
Chicago and the two talk about a tax scheme to
raise more money-AI-Arian would give money
from Chicago to Damrah, Damrah would then give
the money to wealthy people in the Cleveland
Mosque, who would then donate it back to Islamic
Committee for Palestine; the wealthy people could
then use the donation as a tax write off and donate
the savings to Islamic Committee for Palestine. The
scheme was never carried out.
Associated Press, June - Ramadah Abdullah Shallah was also a Univer-
28, 2004, Vickie sity of South Florida professor, but left in late 1995
Chachere, Group to head Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
criticizes Castor's han- * Allegations against Sami AI-Arian first started in
dling of Al-Arian case 1994. No internal university investigation was
started until Shaflah left.
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* Betty Castor, former president of University of
South Florida and current U.S. Senate candidate in
Florida, tried to find out about the alleged terrorist
connection between AI-Arian, Shallah and the uni-
versity from the FBI but was not given any infor-
mation about the investigation. Therefore she did
not take action against the professor.
- AI-Arian was placed on leave after a FBI search
warrant was made public in 1996, but was allowed
to return to the school in 1998.
The Miami Herald, June o AI-Arian was fired from the university by Castors'
29, 2004, Marc Caputo, successor as president of the university after he was
Castor Grilled About Pro- indicted for supporting Islamic Jihad on February
fessor; Candidate Betty 26, 2003.
Castor is under fire for 9 Castor received two FBI affidavits about AI-Arian
allegedly misrepresenting during her tenure as university president about Al-
what she knew about an Arian's activities. They described phone calls from
accused terrorist while she al-Arian's home to numbers associated with the
was University of South World Trade Center bombing and alleged that he
Florida president at page used two groups as a front to help international ter-
B1 rorists get around immigration laws and enter the
country to raise money for anti-Israeli causes.
o The faculty at the University of South Florida pro-
tested Al-Arian's paid suspension in 1996.
Associated Press, July 2, o Betty Castor became president of the University of
2004, Vickie Chachere, South Florida in 1994.
Senate Hopeful Castor o Allegations soon began regarding terrorist associa-
faces questions on terror tions, leading to the nickname "Jihad University".
financing case o The University attempted to expand its understand-
ing of the Middle East, but apparently was cor-
rupted in the process.
* Soon after Castor took office a documentary, "Jihad
in America" and a series of articles in the Tampa
Tribune discussed Al-Arian's activities.
* In mid-1995, Ramadan Abdullah Shallah sud-
denly left the university to become the head of
Islamic Jihad in Syria. Shallah was brought to the
University by AI-Arian.
e AI-Arian established an Islamic think tank (World
and Islam Studies Enterprises (WISE)) and an affil-
iated charity which were allegedly connected to ter-
rorism.
o The indictment against AI-Arian alleges that he
used the think tank and charity as a way to bring
terrorists into the U.S. for conferences. The confer-
ences were used as a way to raise money for terror-
ist attacks in Israel.
o Again discusses the difficulty Castor faced trying to
find out about any possible link to terrorism
because of the secrecy of the investigation.
a A1-Arian's phones had been tapped since 1993.
The Miami Herald, July * Time line of activities discussed above.
6, 2004, A1-Arian time-
line, at page B5
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Source Holy Land Foundation
The Chicago Sun-Times, * An associate of Sami Al-Arian, Hatem Fariz who
July 8, 2004, Natasha is awaiting trial in Florida on terrorism charges,
Korecki, New Charges in was arrested in Chicago for charges unrelated to
terror-funding case, at terrorism fundraising: stealing money from an elec-
page 27 tronic food stamp program.
Fariz is one of the 7 associates charged along with
A1-Arian.
Source Safa Group
Facts on File World News * The Safa Group is the name given to the umbrella
Digest, October 30, 2003, group, centered around northern Virginia, which is
Terrorist Attack After- alleged to have "maintained a financial and ideolog-
math: Alamoudi Charged ical relationship with Hamas and the Palestinian
in Charity Probe: Other Islamic Jihad". An affidavit in support of raids of
Developments, at page the Safa Group in 2002 did not present direct evi-
892B3. dence of terrorist financing, but instead was based
on tax discrepancies.
* Abdurahman Alamoudi was charged with laun-
dering money, false statements & conducting illegal
transactions with Libya. An affidavit stated he
"funneled money to terrorist organizations "includ-
ing al Qaeda and Hamas", but he does not face any
terrorism charges.
* Alamoudi was founder of the American Muslim
Foundation and the American Muslim Council and
was designer of the U.S. military's Muslim chaplain
program.
* Alamoudi was first detained in London on August
16, 2003 because he had $340,000 in undeclared
money in his suitcase. At the time, he was travel-
ing from Syria.
* The government alleges Alamoudi financed various
terrorist organizations by using charitable organiza-
tions as fronts, including: Taibah Aid Association,
Success, Foundation, & Happy Hearts Trust (based
in Isle of Man).
Cox News Service, * The Safa Group is comprised of more than 100
November 13, 2003, charities, educational organizations and companies.
Rebecca Carr & Eunice * Alleged that Safa Group has been using charities to
Moscoso, Safa Group "transmit money internationally for the purpose of
Charities Scrutinized for promoting offenses against foreign nations involving
Alleged Terror Ties murder or the destruction of property by means of
explosives, fire, kidnapping or extortion".
* 72% of the donations to charities in the Safa Group
came from other Safa Group members.
a Large money transfers allegedly have been taking
place from the Safa Group to terrorist front organi-
zations since the early 1990s. There is probable
cause to believe some of the money was sent to Holy
Land Foundation and to Sami Omar Al-Arian.
* Taha AI-Alwani has been investigated. He runs
an Islamic graduate school that helps select people
for the military Muslim chaplain program.
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Source Safa Group
* A1-Alwani is connected to Sami Omar A1-Arian.
Safa Group allegedly gave WISE $50,000.
* Abdurahman M. Alamoudi was indicted for laun-
dering money, violating immigration and customs
laws by accepting money from Libya.
* Alamoudi is connected to the Safa Group through
other charities he runs
* Soliman Biheri was convicted in October 2003 of
immigration charges. He has been connected to Al-
Arian and to members of the Safa Group.
Associated Press Online, * Soliman Biheri was convicted of immigration
June 17, 2004, Matthew fraud in 2003, but new charges were brought
Barakat, New Charges for against him days before his scheduled release from
Man Tied to hamas jail
Leader. * The charges include: (1) making false statements to
federal investigators by denying a business relation-
ship with Mousa Abu Marzook (political leader of
Hamas); (2) falsely denying business relationship
with Sami Al-Arian; and (3) fraudulently obtained
a passport.
The Washington Post, * Soliman Biheri was ordered to stay in jail after
June 22, 2004, Kerry U.S. government officials stated that they may file
Markon, Egyptian Man to additional charges.
Remain Jailed; Suspect * Biheri founded BMI Inc, an investment firm in
Held in Connection with New Jersey based on Islamic Principles-Islamic
Va. Islamic Charity charities based in N. Virginia & sponsored by the
Probe, at page A02 Saudi government invested nearly $4 million in
BMI.
* U.S. federal government alleges Biheri came to the
U.S. to finance and support terrorist groups.
Cox News Service, June * U.S. federal government documents allege $12.6
29, 2004, Rebecca Carr & million went from a foundation connected to a
Bill Torpy, Documents Gainesville, Georgia chicken plant to a secret bank
Unsealed in Terror account held by Sheik Sulaiman A. Al Rajhi, a
Finance Probe. financial supporter of Osama bin Laden.
* Charities and businesses in northern Virginia (the
government has named them the Safa Group) have
been connected with the chicken plant.
* No arrests or indictments have yet resulted from
the numerous raids that have been conducted on
the Safa Group.
- One affidavit in support of a raid alleged the group
had been using charities and businesses to "trans-
mit money internationally for the purpose of pro-
moting offenses against foreign nations involving
murder or the destruction of property by means of
explosives, fire, kidnapping or extortion".
e The Safa Group was linked to Al-Qaeda by Benevo-
lence International Foundation (headed by Hassan
Bahafzallah (also a member of the advisory council
for International Islamic Relief Organization "which
is widely reputed to have been used to support al
Qaeda)) because Al Rajhi was connected with
Benevolence.
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol25/iss2/4
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Source Safa Group
The Atlanta-Journal Con- * Same content as the Cox article on June 29th.
stitution, June 30, 2004,
Rebecca Carr & Bill
Torpy, Terror Money Trail
Pursued; Government
sheds new light on bid to
link Georgia plant to bin
Laden backer
The New York Times, - Abdurahman Alamoudi agreed to plead guilty to
July 30, 2004 having illegal business dealings with Libya and
Eric Lichtblau, Islamic acknowledged his role in plotting with Muammar
Leader to Plead Guilty to el-Qaddafi to kill Crown Prince Abdullah.
Libya Plot, at page 14 * Alamoudi is president of the American Muslim
Foundation.
e Alamoudi in the past had raised substantial
amounts of money in the Middle East for American
Muslim charitable causes.
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Exhibit D
Terrorist Financing Staff Monograph
Chapter 6: The Illinois Charities Case Study
Two Illinois-based charities, the Global Relief Foundation (GRF)
and the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), were publicly
accused by the federal government shortly after 9/11 of providing
financial support to al Qaeda and international terrorism. The FBI had
already been investigating both GRF and BIF for several years, but only
after 9/11 did the government move to shut down these organizations and
stop their flow of funds overseas.
18
Introduction
GRF, a charitable organization ostensibly devoted to providing
humanitarian aid to the needy, with operations in 25 countries around the
world, raised millions of dollars in the United States in support of its
mission. U.S. investigators have long believed that GRF was devoting a
significant percentage of the funds it raised to support Islamic extremist
causes and jihadists with substantial links to international terrorist
groups, including al Qaeda, and the FBI had a very active investigation
under way by the time of 9/11. BIF, a charitable organization with
offices in at least 10 countries around the world, raised millions of
dollars in the United States, much of which it distributed throughout the
world for purposes of humanitarian aid. As in the case of GRF, the U.S.
government believed BIF had substantial connections to terrorist groups,
including al Qaeda, and was sending a substantial percentage of its funds
to support the international jihadist movement. BIF was also the subject
of an active investigation by 9/11.
After 9/11, OFAC froze both charities' assets, effectively putting
them out of business. The FBI opened a criminal investigation of both
charities, ultimately resulting in the conviction of the leader of BIF for
non-terrorism-related charges. The Immigration and Naturalization
Service detained and ultimately deported a major GRF fund-raiser. No
18. This chapter is based on interviews with many participants, including FBI
agents and supervisors, OFAC personnel, representatives of BIF and GRF, as well as
other witnesses, extensive review of contemporaneous documents, both classified and
unclassified, from a variety of agencies, and the court filings and judicial opinions from
litigation concerning BIF and GRF.
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criminal charges have been filed against GRF or its personnel, as of this
writing.
The cases of BIF and GRF illustrate the U.S. government's
approach to terrorist fund-raising in the United States before 9/11 and
how that approach dramatically changed after the terrorist attacks,
moving from a strategy of merely investigating and monitoring terrorist
financing to one of active disruption through criminal prosecution and
the use of its powers under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA) to block the assets of suspect entities in the United
States. Although effective in shutting down its targets, this aggressive
approach raises potential civil liberties concerns. The BIF and GRF
investigations also highlight two fundamental issues that span all aspects
of the government's efforts to combat al Qaeda financing: the difference
between seeing "links" to terrorists and proving the funding of terrorists,
and the problem of defining the threshold of information necessary to
take disruptive action.
FBI Investigations of BIF and GRF before 9/11
Contrary to a common misconception, the FBI did not ignore
terrorist financing before 9/11. The intelligence side of the FBI gathered
extensive information on terrorist fund-raising in the United States,
although the Bureau lacked any strategy for disrupting the activity. In
various field offices around the country, street agents actively
investigated groups and individuals, including GRF and BIF, suspected
of raising funds for al Qaeda or other extremist groups. Working in the
face of many obstacles, including what agents believed to be a
dysfunctional FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) process,
these agents aggressively gathered information and tried to coordinate
with other field offices, the intelligence community, and even foreign
governments. The FBI lacked a headquarters unit that focused on
terrorist financing before 9/11, however, and also lacked a coherent
national approach to tackling the problem. As Assistant Director,
Counterterrorism John Pistole testified, "there did not exist within the
FBI a mechanism to ensure appropriate focus on terrorist finance issues
and provide the necessary expertise and overall coordination to
comprehensively address these matters."' 9
19. Terrorism Financing: Origination, Organization, and Prevention: Hearing
before the Sen. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong.
(2003) (testimony of John Pistole, Exec. Ass't Dir. for Counterterrorism and Counter-
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Origins of GRF
GRF was incorporated in Bridgeview, Illinois, in 1992. According
to the U.S. government, GRF's founders had previously been affiliated
with the Mektab al Khidmat (MAK) or "Human Services Office,"
cofounded by Abdullah Azzam and Usama Bin Ladin in the 1980s to
recruit and support mujahideen to fight against the Soviets in
Afghanistan. MAK funneled money and fighters to the mujahideen and
set up a network of recruiting offices around the world, including in the
United States. The U.S. government has called MAK the "precursor
organization to al Qaeda. ''20 One offshoot of MAK in the United States,
the Al Khifa Refugee Center in Brooklyn, facilitated the movement of
jihadist fighters in and out of Afghanistan. After the defeat of the
Soviets, MAK and Al Kifah continued the mission of supporting jihadist
fighters throughout the world. According to the U.S. government, a
number of the persons convicted in the first World Trade Center
bombing were associated with the Al Khifa Refugee Center, as was
Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the "Blind Sheikh," who is now serving a
life sentence for his role in the foiled plan to bomb New York City
tunnels and landmarks. President George W. Bush designated MAK/Al
Khifa a specially designated global terrorist in the original annex to
Executive Order 13224 on September 23, 2001.
GRF described itself as a nongovernmental organization (NGO) that
provided humanitarian relief aid to Muslims through overseas offices
around the world, especially in strife-torn regions such as Bosnia,
Kashmir, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Chechnya. GRF began operating
with $700,000 in cash. By 2000, it reported more than $5 million in
annual contributions. According to its Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
filings, GRF sent 90 percent of its donations abroad between 1994 and
2000.21 GRF's numerous offices overseas received their own
contributions in addition to what they received from the U.S. operation.
intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigations, available at http://www.senate.gov/-gov
affairs/index.cfm?useaction=Hearings.Detail&HearinglD=106 (last visited Apr. 12,
2005).
20. Treasury Department Statement Regarding the Designation of the Global Relief
Foundation, Oct. 18, 2002, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/ po3553.htm
(last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
21. For example, GRF sent $3.2 million overseas in 1999; and $3.7 million
overseas in 2000.
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The FBI investigation of GRF before 9/11
GRF came to the attention of the FBI's Chicago Division in the
mid-1990s, because of GRF's affiliation with Al Khifa and other
unsubstantiated allegations about GRF's potential involvement in
terrorist activity. After lying dormant for some time, the GRF
investigation was assigned to two agents, who began to discover
evidence of what they viewed as suspicious conduct. The Chicago office
opened a formal full field investigation (FFI) 22 in late 1997, largely on
the strength of a series of telephone calls between GRF personnel and
others with terrorist affiliations, as well as information from the
intelligence community that GRF personnel had undertaken suspicious
travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Chicago agents stepped up the
investigation of GRF, including physical surveillance, review of GRF's
trash, and attempts to get telephone records through a legal request
known as a National Security Letter (NSL). Among other things, the
trash revealed copies of GRF's newsletter, "Al-Thilal" ("The Shadow"),
which openly advocated a militant interpretation of Islam and armed
jihad.
The NSLs yielded very useful information, but the process for their
internal approval frustrated the Chicago agents, who said that the
tremendous delays in getting NSLs authorized by FBI headquarters was
the biggest obstacle they had to overcome in their pre-9/1 1 investigation
of GRF. It routinely took six months to a year to get NSLs approved for
routine documents, such as telephone or bank records. The Chicago
agents believed their contact at the FBI headquarters in the Radical
Fundamentalist Unit was very good at his job, but was overwhelmed
with work, which caused a major bottleneck in getting the NSLs.
The Chicago agents received substantial information about GRF
from foreign government agencies. They worked directly through the
relevant FBI legal attach6, or Legat (an FBI agent posted overseas who
acts as a liaison with foreign officials), to get foreign information. The
process could be very slow and somewhat uncertain, but it often yielded
helpful information. One European country where GRF had a substantial
office provided the most useful information in the early stages of the
investigation.
22. Approval to open an FF1 requires some predication that the investigation is
being conducted for legitimate intelligence purposes. Agents, using limited investigative
techniques can open a preliminary investigation (PI) for a limited time to gather evidence
to determine whether a FF1 is warranted.
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By mid-1998, the Chicago agents had evidence that led them to
conclude that GRF was doing much more than providing humanitarian
aid. The Chicago office summarized its views in an August 3, 1998,
memorandum: "The FBI believes that GRF, through its Bridgeview
headquarters and satellite offices around the globe, is actively involved
in supplying and raising funds for international terrorism and Islamic
militant movements overseas." At the time, the FBI suspected the
executive director of being a supporter or member of the Egyptian
extremist group Al Gama'a Al Islamiyya (AGAI), which was affiliated
with the Blind Sheikh.
The Chicago office submitted a FISA application for GRF in mid-
1998; it was not approved until mid-1999. According to the Chicago
agents, the application posed no significant problems, although it
appeared that the fact that domestic charities were involved may have
slowed the process. In any event, it took a year for the application to be
approved and authorized. After receiving FISA approval, the agents
initiated electronic surveillance, which allowed them to expand the
investigation.
By late 1999, the Chicago case agents were comfortable in their
conclusion that GRF was a jihadist organization and that its executive
director had connections to both AGIA and what they called the "Islamic
Army organization of international terrorist financier Usama Bin
Ladin. '' 23 They believed that multiple sources of evidence supported
these conclusions. In the agents' view, the phone records they had
obtained proved a compelling, although indirect, link between GRF's
executive director and Usama Bin Ladin. In reviewing intelligence
information and the executive director's phone records, they concluded
that the executive director called a phone used by a mujahideen leader
who was a close associate of Usama Bin Ladin. Phone records also
connected GRF, through its office in Brussels, Belgium, with Bin
Ladin's former personal secretary, Wadi al Hage, who is now serving a
life sentence in the United States for his role in the 1998 embassy
bombings.
The Chicago FBI agents were able to get critical information about
the persons associated with international phone numbers because they
had a working relationship with the CIA before 9/11. The Chicago
agents said the quality of this relationship varied depending on the CIA
representatives, who tended to be replaced frequently. Although the
23. January 20, 1999, FBI Document (on file with author).
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relationship was not always smooth, it did succeed in providing
important information.
The Chicago agents also conducted "trash covers," virtually every
week for years, which provided key intelligence on GRF. In this
technique, the agents secretly entered GRF's dumpster late at night and
took out its trash for review. Among other things, GRF threw away
pictures of communication gear it had shipped overseas, including
sophisticated military-style handheld radios that the agents believed were
far beyond what relief workers would ever need, but valuable to set up a
military communications network. After 9/11, they learned this
communication gear was shipped to Chechnya. They also found in
GRF's trash pro jihad books and literature, including the writings of
Abdullah Azzam.
The Chicago agents summarized their view of GRF to a foreign
government service in a January 6, 2000, memorandum:
Although the majority of GRF funding goes toward legitimate relief operations, a
significant percentage is diverted to fund extremist causes. Among the terrorist
groups known to have links to the GRF are the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Gama'at Al Islamyia, and the Kashmiri Harakat Al-Jihad
El-Islam, as well as the al Qaeda organization of Usama Bin Laden.... In the
past, GRF support to terrorists and other transnational mujahideen fighters has
taken the form of purchase and shipment of large quantities of sophisticated
communications equipment, provision of humanitarian cover documentation to
suspected terrorists and fund-raising for terrorist groups under the cover of
humanitarian relief.24
By 9/11, the Chicago agents believed that they had uncovered
enough information to conclude that GRF was raising substantial funds
in the United States to support international jihad. Bank records obtained
through NSLs revealed large transfers of funds to the GRF overseas
offices. The agents believed GRF distributed the bulk of funds as
humanitarian relief, but also supported armed militants in the strife-torn
regions where it was active.
On January 10, 2001, the Chicago agents wrote that "GRF is a
highly organized fundraising machine, which raises millions of dollars
annually" and that GRF's "operations have extended all over the
globe. 25  The executive director, in his capacity as head of the
organization, "has been and continues to be a supporter of worldwide
Islamic extremist activity" and he "has past and present links and
associations with a wide variety of international Muslim extremists,"
24. January 6, 2000 FBI Document (on file with author).
25. January 10, 2001 FBI Document (on file with author).
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including al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin. The agents did not believe
GRF was part of the formal al Qaeda network. Instead, they believed it
"free-lanced" to support jihadists around the world, including in Europe,
Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. They also knew GRF was underwriting
substantial humanitarian aid, which they thought was critical to its pro-
jihad mission.26
The Chicago agents believed GRF had two types of donors during
this period. People not in the know thought they were giving money for
humanitarian relief. Others clearly knew the purpose of their donations:
When the agents later obtained donors' checks, they saw that some
donors had actually written pro-jihad statements on their memo lines.
The money trail generally stopped at the U.S. border, and the agents
could never trace it directly to jihadists or terrorists. Before 9/11, they
had no means to get foreign bank records. A formal request for records,
called a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) request, was impossible
because the FBI did not have an open criminal investigation-the GRF
inquiry was an intelligence investigation. The agents did ask one
European country for help, but were told that that country's restrictive
laws prohibited electronic surveillance and obtaining bank records. The
Chicago agents wanted to travel to Europe to meet with officials who had
investigated GRF, but the Chicago FBI office denied permission because
of budgetary constraints.
The Chicago investigation of GRF in turn led to an investigation by
the Detroit FBI agents of GRF subjects within its jurisdiction. In early
2000, Chicago informed Detroit that GRF's executive director had been
calling two Michigan residents. One of these subjects was considered
GRF's spiritual leader and the other, Rabih Haddad, was a major GRF
fund-raiser. A Detroit agent went to Chicago and reviewed the extensive
investigative file. Upon his return, the agent prepared a request to open
FFIs on the two subjects; it was approved in late March 2000. The
evidence gathered in Chicago made clear to the Detroit agent that the
GRF investigation was potentially "pretty big. 27
The Detroit agents, however, believed themselves to be stymied by
the inability to get FISA coverage. At the same time that the case agent
opened the FFIs, he sought FISA coverage of those two subjects. None
of these FISA applications was approved until after 9/11, some 18
months later. The Detroit agent was never given even an ostensible
26. January 10, 2001 FBI Document (on file with author).
27. Commission Staff Interview.
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reason for the holdup. On the contrary, FBI headquarters told the agent
that the applications looked good. These applications were being
actively reviewed by both OIPR and FBI headquarters. Still, nothing
ever happened. When he called FBI headquarters to check on the status
of his applications, the Detroit agent was told only "we're [the FBI]
working on it." The Detroit agent was very frustrated and upset by the
delay, which he believes caused him to miss a great opportunity to gather
critical intelligence and substantially limited the Detroit investigation of
GRF before 9/11.
Resource limitations also limited Detroit's role before 9/11.
Though many counterterrorism investigations might have been
undertaken, Detroit had only 12 agents on these cases; and because each
agent was working multiple cases, no case could receive the attention it
needed. Because of the lack of FISA coverage, resource limitations, and
the apparent focus GRF's activities in Chicago, the Detroit investigation
was largely a satellite to the Chicago investigation before 9/11.
The Chicago agents thought that FBI headquarters provided support
for their GRF investigation before 9/11, approving the FISA application,
for example, and providing analytical support. In addition, one of the
analysts at headquarters saw relevant material in a case file from another
field office and very helpfully brought it to Chicago's attention. From
the Detroit perspective, however, headquarters was interested in the GRF
investigation but was swamped with work and itself understaffed.
No realistic opportunities for disruption before 9/11
The Chicago agents saw no way to make a criminal case against
GRF before 9/11, even though the agents thought they had considerable
evidence that GRF was a major fund-raising operation for international
jihad. The two lead agents thought about and even discussed the
possibility of mounting a criminal case, but dismissed it. They had much
smoke but no real fire-they had no direct evidence of serious criminal
activity. They could not trace the millions of dollars GRF sent overseas
to any specific jihadist or terrorist organization, although they had their
suspicions. Even the electronic surveillance coverage yielded no
evidence that would conclusively prove a criminal offense.
The Chicago agents worked with the INS to pick up several GRF
employees on immigration overstays, with the goal of seeing if they
would cooperate with the FBI against their employer. This effort proved
fruitless, however. They considered doing the same with Rabih Haddad,
the Detroit subject and major GRF fund-raiser, but decided it made more
276 [Vol. 25:233
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sense to continue investigating him; the Detroit agents agreed.28 The
Chicago agents thought that the executive director himself was also
technically out of status-he had requested a certain status adjustment
from the INS but not yet received it-though an arrest in such a situation
would be unusual. In any event, they did not ask the INS to arrest him,
preferring to continue to monitor him.
The very concept of a criminal international terrorism case was
foreign to the Chicago agents, and they did not think that the U.S.
Attorney's Office had sufficient expertise in such cases. In addition, the
agents believed that the rules regarding "the wall" between intelligence
and criminal cases prevented the case agents from even discussing
intelligence information with the U.S. Attorney's Office. Other than in
New York, there were few criminal international terrorist (IT)
investigations or cases in process. The Chicago office was undertaking
only two criminal IT investigations, neither of which focused on al
Qaeda suspects. According to the agent who supervised the GRF and
BIF cases before 9/11, the case agents had always wanted to open a
criminal case, despite the wall; but they thought that doing so would
have hurt their ability to get and maintain FISA coverage because of their
perception of the Department of Justice's restrictive interpretations of the
wall restrictions, which they understood had impaired the Chicago
office's ability to get FISA warrants approved in the past. As result,
Chicago agents were cautious about pursuing criminal matters pertaining
to ongoing intelligence investigations.
The lead Detroit investigator also saw no prospect of a criminal case
before 9/11. He said that while working the case as an intelligence
investigation he always kept in the back of his mind that possibility, but
he knew that he had nowhere near the type of evidence required for
criminal prosecution; he had his own concerns about the wall as well. In
any event, neither Detroit nor Chicago, which had the lead in formulating
an overall strategy, had sufficient evidence to move forward with
criminal charges.
The Chicago investigation of GRF suffered a major blow in late
spring or early summer 2001 when the FISA warrants were not extended.
The Chicago agents were now in the same position as those in Detroit-
deprived of electronic surveillance, their most potent intelligence-
gathering tool.
28. The Chicago and Detroit agents each attributed to the other the decision to
refrain from detaining Haddad, but both agree they concurred with the decision made by
the other, without objection.
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GRF's status on 9/11
The FBI's investigation over the several years before 9/11 led the
investigating agents to believe GRF was an organization dedicated to
supporting international jihad and was raising substantial funds in the
United States toward that goal. The FBI agents developed what they
thought was a good understanding of GRF's activities, despite significant
obstacles imposed by a dysfunctional process for obtaining NSLs and
FISA warrants. Although the FBI did the bulk of the work investigating
GRF, the investigation benefited from contributions by the intelligence
community and by foreign law enforcement sources, both of which
substantially aided the FBI's understanding of the GRF's overseas
activities. Despite the considerable body of knowledge they had, the FBI
agents believed they lacked the evidence necessary to bring a criminal
prosecution against GRF or its principals. In any event, the perceived
restrictions imposed by the wall made such a prosecution extremely
difficult, at best, and initiating a criminal investigation could have put the
FISA warrants at risk. As a result, the FBI was left with nothing to do
but continue to gather intelligence on GRF's activities in the United
States. This task was made far more difficult by the inability to renew
the FISA warrants in Chicago or obtain FISA coverage in Detroit. The
agents did not have any plan to disrupt what they believed to be a major
jihadist fund-raising operation, or any endgame for their investigation.
The origin of BIF
BIF was incorporated in Illinois in March 1992 and received tax-
exempt status in March 1993. Its origins can be traced to Saudi Arabia,
where in 1987 Sheikh Adel Abdul Jalil Batterjee founded Lajnat Al-Bin
Al-Islami (LBI), a Jeddah-based NGO. LBI provided support to the
mujahideen fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, as well as humanitarian
aid to refugees of the war in Afghanistan. Batterjee, from a merchant
family in Saudi Arabia, was affiliated with a group of wealthy donors
from the Persian Gulf region known as the "Golden Chain," which
provided support to mujahideen, including mujahideen under the
leadership of Usama Bin Ladin. The U.S. government has alleged that
BIF was incorporated in the United States to attract more donations and
deflect scrutiny from LBI.
At BIF's founding in 1992, its three directors were Batterjee and
two other Saudis. In March 1993, Batterjee and the two other Saudis
were replaced by three new directors, including Enaam Arnaout, who
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became BIF's executive director, managing its day-to-day operations and
reporting to Batterjee. The U.S. government contends the change was
made after Batterjee came under scrutiny in Saudi Arabia for financially
supporting jihad outside of approved channels. Despite his formal
removal, Batterjee continued to play a major role in running BIF and was
in frequent contact with Amaout from his home in Saudi Arabia. The
government contends that Arnaout was a longtime jihadist supporter,
with personal ties to Usama Bin Ladin dating back to the 1980s. He
allegedly provided military and logistical support to the mujahideen in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, as an employee of LBI and another Saudi
NGO, the Muslim World League. In doing so, he allegedly worked
closely with Usama Bin Ladin and other mujahideen who later became
significant members or supporters of al Qaeda. According to INS data
compiled by the FBI, Arnaout, a native Syrian, lived in Hama, Syria,
from his birth in 1962 until 1981, when he went to study in Saudi Arabia.
In 1989, Arnaout married an American citizen he met in Peshawar, and
he became a naturalized U.S. citizen in March 1994.
BIF publicly described itself as an "organization devoted to
relieving the suffering of Muslims around the world." According to its
IRS filings, it received more than $15 million in donations between 1995
and 2000.
The FBI investigation of BIF
The FBI started its investigation of BIF in 1998 as a result of a
conference that a Chicago agent attended in Washington, D.C., where he
learned of foreign intelligence reports indicating that Arnaout was
involved in providing logistical support for jihadists. The FBI in
Chicago opened an FFI in February 1999, focusing on Amaout as the
key player. The GRF case agents also served as the lead case agents on
BIF investigation. Much like the early GRF investigation, BIF
investigation featured surveillance and digging through garbage. The
FBI also sought to develop sources. The trash covers were fruitful, as
BIF "threw out everything"-including telephone bills and detailed and
elaborate reports on its activities, which Arnaout demanded from his
subordinates on a daily basis. The FBI began to run down some of the
names and numbers appearing in the trash. In addition, on April 21,
1999, the agents recovered from BIF's trash a newspaper article on
bioterrorism, in which someone had highlighted sections relating to the
United States' lack of preparedness for a biological attack.
When it opened the FFI, the FBI in Chicago knew of Adel Batterjee
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but had little understanding of who he was. They later obtained records
showing Batterjee was contributing funds to BIF. In the summer of
1999, they sent what the Bureau calls a lead-relaying information and
requesting action-to Saudi Arabia, through the Legat, for information on
Batterjee. As of 9/11 they still had received no response.
Chicago submitted a FISA request in April 2000, but it was not
approved until after 9/11. Notwithstanding evidence that BIF had
significant links to Usama Bin Ladin and was sending significant
amounts of money overseas, the Chicago agents could not get an inside
look at the organization that a FISA could provide. As we will later
show, after 9/11 it was simply too late.
After opening the FFI, FBI Chicago obtained NSLs for phone and
bank records. The bank records gave a good indication of the scope of
BIF's fund-raising activities. According to contemporaneous documents,
the FBI believed based on its yet to be completed investigation that BIF
was receiving approximately forty to sixty thousand dollars a week, and
that between 1997 and 1998, BIF sent more than $2.5 million to its
overseas offices in Bosnia, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan.
FBI Chicago had cultivated a good human source who provided
useful information on BIF, though never any smoking guns. The
Chicago agents had a much closer relationship with the CIA on BIF than
they did on GRF, because they cooperated on certain international
matters in the BIF investigation. They regularly met with the CIA
concerning BIF, received some useful information, and shared much of
their information. For example, the Chicago agents learned from the
CIA important information about BIF's founding and the sources of its
funding. Still, the CIA and the FBI did not have a perfect relationship,
and the CIA held back some information. The Chicago agents believed
the CIA wanted to shield certain information from the FBI because of
fears of revealing sources and methods in any potential criminal
litigation in the United States.
The Chicago agents obtained all the bank account numbers for the
BIF's overseas offices, which BIF had typed up and later thrown out in
the trash. They provided this information to the intelligence community,
which they hoped could trace the money overseas. They never heard
anything back about such a trace, however.
The BIF investigation revealed the difficulties in securing foreign
cooperation in terrorism investigations. FBI Chicago submitted a lead to
a European ally, through the Legat, for information about European
intelligence reports concerning a BIF official's purported involvement in
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the kidnapping of Americans in Kashmir. The U.S. ally never even
acknowledged the request, let alone replied. The FBI did not submit
MLAT requests for foreign records because, again, it had no criminal
case.
The FBI's New York Field Office, which ran the primary FBI
investigation of Bin Ladin, was a key source of information for Chicago.
But the New York agents were overwhelmed with work, and did not
always coordinate well with their Chicago counterparts. Although the
New York agents were aware of the BIF/GRF investigations, they sent
out their own leads relevant to these investigations, annoying the
Chicago agents. The agents in New York did not have time to share
information proactively, although those in Chicago were welcome to
look through New York's files for relevant information-which they did,
gaining helpful information.29
GRF's bank filed a money-laundering Suspicious Activity Report
with the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN) regarding BIF's large transfers of money to the Republic of
Georgia. It was apparently concerned that BIF was involved with
Russian organized crime. The Chicago agents said they did not make
any requests of FinCEN before 9/11, explaining that FinCEN would not
have been useful to them because it could not help them trace the money
once it got overseas. They knew that BIF was sending big money
overseas, and even knew the account numbers and office directors of the
BIF overseas offices that were receiving the money. Their problem was
tracing the money once it got there, and they believed FinCEN could
provide no help in this regard because, like the FBI agents, it had no
access to the relevant foreign records.
Inability to bring a criminal case to disrupt BIF
Overall, BIF investigation was in the same position as the GRF
investigation on 9/11: the agents believed BIF had substantial ties to al
Qaeda, was supporting jihad, and was sending a great deal of money
overseas, but they could not trace the money directly to its ultimate
destination overseas. Although they had access to considerable
information, the agents believed they still could not come close to
proving a criminal case against Arnaout or BIF. The BIF investigation
29. According to the BIF's attorney, the bank actually closed the BIF's accounts
just before 9/11, forcing BIF to find another bank in the Chicago area, which it was able
to do.
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was actually in worse shape because, unlike in the GRF investigation, the
agents could not get approval for electronic surveillance. The agents
tried to understand what was going on overseas, and a European agency
had invited the Chicago agents to a meeting to share information. The
agents tried to go but, as had happened with the GRF investigation, the
Chicago FBI could not afford to send them. The misunderstanding of the
wall also created the same problems in the BIF investigation as it did in
that of the GRF. For all of these reasons, the FBI could not take any
action against BIF, despite what the agents considered extensive
knowledge of BIF's malfeasance.
Like the GRF investigation, the BIF investigation lacked an
endgame. Believing themselves unable to initiate a criminal
investigation and lacking any other means to disrupt what they thought to
be a major jihadist fund-raising operation with substantial links to Bin
Ladin and al Qaeda, the Chicago agents saw no options other than
continued monitoring of BIF's activities. In this respect, the BIF and
GRF investigations typified the FBI's pre-9/11 approach to terrorist
financing. The FBI had numerous terrorist-financing investigations
under way, but the vast majority of them were pursued as intelligence-
gathering exercises by FBI intelligence agents, with little or no thought
of disrupting the fund-raising through criminal prosecution or otherwise.
Post-9/11 Developments
FBI investigations of BIF and GRF after 9/11
Everything changed almost immediately after 9/11 with respect to
the BIF and GRF investigations. Major obstacles to the investigation
dropped away, more resources became available, and the issue of
terrorist financing gained new prominence among national policymakers
in Washington.
As a result, the course of the BIF and GRF investigations
dramatically changed and led to a series of events unimaginable on 9/10:
the long-delayed FISA warrants were instantaneously approved; the FBI
opened a major criminal investigation of GRF and BIF; FBI agents
raided the Illinois headquarters of both organizations in an
unprecedented overt FISA search; OFAC-an entity entirely unknown to
the FBI case agents before 9/1 1-froze the assets of GRF and BIF;
NATO troops kicked in doors of the charities' overseas offices and
carted away all their contents; and Bosnian criminal investigators raided
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BIF's office in Bosnia, seizing a treasure trove of documents directly
concerning BIF's relationship with Bin Ladin that dated to the origins of
al Qaeda.
In the immediate wake of 9/11, the Chicago FISA warrant for GRF
was reinstated, and that for BIF was finally approved. The previously
moribund FISA applications from Detroit for GRF were approved as
well, as the agent was informed by an emergency call from FBI
headquarters.
But after the events of 9/11, electronic surveillance was not very
useful, even though the FBI assigned a significant number of translators
to the cases. The agents believed that the GRF subjects feared electronic
monitoring in the wake of the attacks; they were extremely cautious
about their communications. The GRF FISA warrants proved
unproductive. On the other hand, electronic surveillance of BIF yielded
some useful information, including the fact that Arnaout was passing
messages to Batterjee. In addition to electronic surveillance, the agents
continued other investigative techniques, including trash covers and
physical surveillance.
Coincidentally, the U.S. Attorney for Chicago, Patrick Fitzgerald,
on the job for only a couple of weeks, had extensive experience as a
terrorism prosecutor and immediately became involved in the
investigation of BIF and GRF.30  Fitzgerald was very interested in
prosecuting the cases criminally and, at his urging, the FBI opened a
criminal investigation of BIF and GRF in October 2001. The
intelligence cases continued as well, and the electronic surveillance
continued. Because the wall between criminal and intelligence matters
still existed, they decided to have separate case agents for the criminal
and intelligence investigations. The lead intelligence case agents moved
to the criminal case, and two new agents were assigned to the
intelligence cases. The new intelligence agents were responsible for
passing information over the wall to the criminal agents.
Fitzgerald immersed himself in the case and took a major role. He
directed the FBI to interview al Qaeda cooperators from the New York
cases, who provided considerable information on BIF and some on GRF
as well. One cooperator, an admitted former al Qaeda member and Bin
30. Fitzgerald took office pursuant to an interim appointment on September 1,
2001; he was formally appointed and confirmed by the Senate in October. Fitzgerald had
extensive experience prosecuting terrorism cases as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in New
York, where he prosecuted the Landmarks and Embassy Bombings cases and served
nearly six years as co-chief of the Organized Crime and Terrorism Section.
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Ladin associate, said that BIF engaged in financial transactions for al
Qaeda in the early 1990s. He also described how al Qaeda would take
cash from charitable NGOs, which would then cover the transactions
with false paperwork. After opening the criminal case, the agents also
were able to issue grand jury subpoenas for additional phone and bank
records.
OFAC involvement and the shutdown of BIF and GRF
While the Chicago agents and prosecutors were starting to think
about bringing criminal cases against BIF and GRF, policymakers in
Washington were thinking about disrupting al Qaeda financing using
whatever tools they had. BIF and GRF came to the attention of OFAC,
which began to consider them for possible designation as a supporter of
al Qaeda. To this end, OFAC dispatched two analysts to Chicago in
early December 2001 to review the FBI files and begin putting together
the evidentiary packages that would support designations.
These plans were dramatically accelerated when CIA analysts,
drawing on intelligence gathered in an unrelated FBI investigation,
expressed concerns that GRF could be involved in a plot to attack the
United States with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Neither the
Chicago agents nor the FBI headquarters analysts, who had extensive
knowledge of GRF, were consulted on this analysis, which a Chicago
FBI supervisor characterized as baseless. The WMD fears led to a plan
to enter and search the overseas offices of GRF and BIF to obtain
swabbings and other evidence related to possible WMD deployment.
BIF was included because the two charities were thought to be related.
Although the WMD allegations were never corroborated, the events of
9/11 led to an understandably cautious approach in dealing with potential
threats of mass casualties.
At the same time, OFAC received word from the General Counsel
of Treasury, who was coordinating the interagency effort against terrorist
financing, that it needed to designate BIF and GRF immediately. OFAC
had not yet developed the evidence necessary for a designation under
IEEPA. As a result, OFAC relied on a provision of IEEPA clarified by
the Patriot Act, which provides that OFAC could freeze the assets
belonging to a suspected terrorist supporter "during the pendency of an
investigation." Only a single piece of paper, signed by the director of
OFAC, was required.3' OFAC announced this action on December 14,
31. According to OFAC, in practice, an interagency group discusses and agrees to
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2001, thereby effectively shutting down both charities in the United
States while gaining additional time to develop the evidentiary packages
necessary for permanent designations. This extraordinary power enabled
the government to stop the charities' operations without any formal
determination of wrongdoing.
The raids on a number of overseas offices also occurred on
December 14, 2001, conducted, in various locations, by NATO troops
and U.S. government personnel. NATO troops raided two GRF offices,
and NATO publicly stated that GRF "is allegedly involved in planning
attacks against targets in the U.S.A. and Europe." 32 At the same time,
Albanian National Police, accompanied by an FBI agent, raided the GRF
office in Tirana and the home of a GRF employee, seizing $20,000 and
taking swabbings for residue of WMD.
The original plan did not call for searches or takedowns of the GRF
and BIF offices in Illinois. Rather, the FBI was to use its FISA warrants
to monitor the charities' reaction to the overseas searches. This plan
went awry when word of the impending action apparently leaked to
GRF. FBI personnel learned that some of the targets of the
investigations may be destroying documents.33 As a result, the FBI
decided to do an unprecedented "overt" FISA search of both GRF and
BIF offices, which was hastily assembled and conducted. Following a
chaotic process, the government agents searched both BIF and GRF
offices in Illinois on December 14, 2001, carting away substantial
evidence. The agents also searched the residence of GRF executive
director and Amaout.
On December 14, 2001, the INS detained GRF fund-raiser Rabih
Haddad, one of the subjects of the Detroit investigation, on the basis that
he was out of his allowed immigration status, having overstayed a
student visa issued in 1998. Following bond hearings that were closed to
the press, public, and Haddad's family, an immigration judge denied bail
and ordered Haddad detained.34
any designation.
32. Philip Shenon, A Nation Challenged: The Money Trail U.S.-Based Muslim
Charity Raided by NATO in Kosovo, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2001, at B5.
33. Press leaks plagued almost every OFAC blocking action that took place in the
United States. The process had extremely poor operational security. In a number of
instances, agents arrived at locations to execute blocking orders and seize businesses only
to find television news camera crews waiting for them.
34. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (setting out
background). The hearing was closed pursuant to a September 21 directive from the
chief immigration judge that immigration judges close immigration proceedings in
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While officials and investigators around the world moved to
eliminate the perceived WMD threat and shut down the operations of
BIF and GRF, investigators working on the 9/11 attacks sought to
understand a curious connection between hijackers Nawaf al Hazmi and
Khalid al Mihdhar and a GRF fund-raiser. On 9/11, the FBI learned that
two days before, hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar had dropped off bags at
an Islamic prayer center in Maryland. The bags, to which the hijackers
had affixed a note stating "[a] gift for the brothers," contained fruit,
clothing, flight logs, and various other materials. The FBI launched an
investigation to determine if the imam of the prayer center played any
roles in the attacks. The investigators quickly determined in addition to
his other responsibilities, the imam worked part-time raising money for
GRF, at the direction of its executive director in Illinois. The FBI
investigated his involvement with 9/11 for one and a half years. It
ultimately concluded that he had no role in supporting the 9/11 attacks,
although the investigating agents considered him to be a supporter of and
fund-raiser for the international jihadist movement.
BIF and GRF challenge the government's actions
The charities aggressively denied any connection to terrorism and
condemned the raids and assets freeze. GRF's lawyer immediately
called the government's action "a terrible, terrible, terrible tragic
mistake," and stated, "If they're investigating terrorism, they're not
going to find anything here." Another GRF spokesman said the
government seized resources that GRF used to "prevent the slow
starvation and gruesome death in parts of the Muslim world that rely on
such badly needed aid."
35
On January 28, 2002, GRF sued the Secretaries of Treasury and
State, the Attorney General, and the Directors of OFAC and the FBI in
federal court in Chicago. GRF requested that the government "unfreeze"
its assets and return the items it seized during the December 14 searches.
Two weeks later, GRF filed a motion for a preliminary injunction,
contending that the government's blocking of its assets and records
violated the law and Constitution.36 BIF filed a similar suit on January
certain "special interest" cases defined by the chief judge.
35. Deanna Bellandi, Two Chicago-area Muslim Charity Groups Raided by
FederalAgents; Assets Frozen, Assoc. PRESS, Dec. 15, 2001.
36. See Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779 at 787 (N.D.
Ill. 2002), affirmed 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting complaint).
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30, 2002, and a similar motion on March 26, 2002. BIF's complaint
proclaimed its activities "entirely lawful," and contended that since its
founding in 1992 it "has provided tens of millions of dollars worth of
humanitarian aid in a dozen countries around the world, as well in the
United States."
37
Upon filing the complaint, BIF's lawyer said, "The government's
actions threaten to destroy our essential constitutional liberties. If we no
longer live in a society where we are secure from unreasonable searches
and from the taking of liberty and property without any form of due
process, then the terrorists will have succeeded in an even greater degree
of destruction than the devastation of Sept. 11.,,38 Despite the blocking
of its assets, BIF and GRF could retain counsel because OFAC granted
them "licenses" to do so. A license is written authorization from OFAC
to spend money in ways otherwise prohibited by the blocking order, such
as the release of blocked funds to pay for legal services.
BIF also sought a license to dispense the bulk of the funds blocked
by the government, which totaled $700,000-800,000, to fund its overseas
charitable causes, including a tuberculosis hospital for children in
Tajikistan and the Charity Women's Hospital in Makhachkala,
Daghestan. BIF supported its request with evidence of its charitable
work, including affidavits from nurses in the hospital attesting to the
importance of BIF's donations. According to BIF's counsel, the
organization wanted to give away $500,000 of the blocked funds rather
than let legal bills consume the money, and it even offered to have FBI
agents accompany the funds overseas to their charitable destination.
OFAC did not grant the license due to concerns that even funds sent to
seemingly legitimate charities can be at least partially diverted to terrorist
activities and OFAC's extremely limited ability to monitor the use of
funds overseas. OFAC did license BIF and GRF to sustain some
operations-retaining some employees and paying utilities, taxes and
U.S. creditors-but most of the employees had to be let go, and the
charities could neither raise new funds nor distribute existing funds
overseas.
39
37. Benevolence International Foundation Inc. v. Ashcroft, (N.D. III.), Complaint.
38. Laurie Cohen, 2nd Muslim Charity Sues U.S. Officials on Terrorism, CHICAGO
TRiB., Jan. 31, 2002, at 1.
39. Ultimately, the charities' legal bills consumed most of the frozen money, which
angered donors who had intended their donations be used for humanitarian relief. See,
e.g., Gregory Vistica, Frozen Assets Going to Legal Bills, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2003, at
A6. According to OFAC, when BIF exhausted the pool of blocked BIF funds, OFAC
also issued licenses authorizing BIF to establish and maintain a legal defense fund in
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Supporters of GRF fund-raiser Rabih Haddad, who was detained on
immigration violations, rallied to his defense. Pointing out that Haddad
had condemned the 9/11 attacks and contending he was a moderate and
respected religious leader in the Detroit community, they considered his
detention in solitary confinement on what appeared to be a minor visa
violation as a prime example of discrimination against Muslims and an
overzealous government response to 9/11, in violation of basic civil
rights. For example, a sympathetic story in a London paper quoted U.S.
Representative John Conyers: "The treatment of Rabih Haddad by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service over the past several weeks has
highlighted everything that is abusive and unconstitutional about our
government's scapegoating of immigrants in the wake of the September
11 terrorist attack.'A
Efforts to develop criminal cases against BIF and GRF
After the preliminary designations and searches of December 14,
2001, the FBI and U.S. Attorney's Office in Chicago focused their
attention on developing a criminal case. To do so, they initially faced
major logistical challenges. The Illinois searches yielded an enormous
amount of information, including hundreds of tapes and videos that had
to be translated and reviewed, and many computer hard drives.
According to the legal requirements imposed by FISA, all of this
information had to be reviewed for "minimization." Since the evidence
was seized under intelligence authorities, the Justice Department could
use only that evidence relevant to an intelligence investigation or a crime
such as terrorism. The logistical difficulties were compounded by the
charities' civil litigation, the blocking order and OFAC's continued need
for access to the materials so that it could build a case for permanent
designations. The latter issue caused considerable frustration and
confusion, as there were no rules about exactly what information in the
FBI files OFAC could lawfully see. In addition, the lead case agents,
who had been intelligence agents, lacked any significant federal criminal
investigative experience, let alone experience in preparing a complex,
document-intensive financial investigation for prosecution.
The criminal investigation of BIF received a huge boost in March
2002. The Chicago agents, who had been working with Bosnian officials
on the case, provided the Bosnians with enough evidence to gain legal
which to accept donations to offset its legal expenses.
40. Andrew Gumbel, The Disappeared, THE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 26, 2002.
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authority to conduct a criminal search of BIF's offices there. An FBI
agent accompanied the Bosnians on the search to ensure a proper chain
of custody necessary for the admission of anything found into a U.S.
criminal proceeding. This search yielded compelling evidence of links
between BIF's leaders, including Arnaout, and Usama Bin Ladin and
other al Qaeda leaders, going back to the 1980s. The material seized
included many documents never before seen by U.S. officials, such as
the actual minutes of al Qaeda meetings, the al Qaeda oath, al Qaeda
organizational charts, and the "Golden Chain" list of wealthy donors to
the Afghan mujahideen, as well as letters between Arnaout and Bin
Ladin, dating to the late 1980s. It was an enormous break.
The Bosnian documents helped kick BIF investigation into high
gear. Meanwhile, the GRF investigation temporarily took a back seat.
On April 30, 2002, Arnaout and BIF were charged with two counts of
pejury; the charge was based on a declaration that Arnaout had filed in
the civil case against OFAC, in which he asserted that BIF never
supported persons engaged in violence or military operations. Arnaout
was taken into custody and denied bail. In September, the court
dismissed the charges because established Supreme Court precedent held
that the particular criminal statute under which he was charged did not
apply to the out-of-court statements in Arnaout's declaration. 41  The
government filed a criminal obstruction of justice case against Arnaout
that same day, on the basis of the same false declaration. BIF was not
charged again.
The government came back with a more substantive indictment of
Arnaout in October 2002, directly alleging that BIF supported al
Qaeda.42 The indictment alleged that Arnaout operated BIF as a criminal
enterprise that for decades used charitable contributions to support al
Qaeda, the Chechen mujahideen, and armed violence in Bosnia. The
government modified the allegations against Arnaout in a superseding
and then a second superseding indictment, the latter of which was filed
on January 22, 2003. It charged Arnaout with one count each of
racketeering conspiracy under RICO (the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization Act), conspiracy to provide material support to
terrorists, providing material support to terrorists, conspiracy to launder
money, and wire fraud and two counts of mail fraud.
41. United States v. Benevolence International, 02 CR 414, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis
17223 (Sept. 13, 2002) (court opinion and order).
42. United States v. Amaout, Second Superseding Indictment at 3 (same language
in initial indictment).
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Attorney General John Ashcroft personally came to Chicago to
announce the filing of the October indictment in a high-profile press
conference. His public statements emphasized BIF's alleged support for
al Qaeda and recounted much of the historic evidence linking Arnaout to
Bin Ladin, including a recitation of the most significant al Qaeda
documents seized at the BIF's office in Bosnia. Condemning BIF and
Arnaout, the Attorney General declared, "There is no moral distinction
between those who carry out terrorist attacks and those who knowingly
finance those attacks., 43 BIF's lawyer believed that the Attorney
General's inflammatory comments about al Qaeda and Bin Ladin
compromised Arnaout's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury and
characterized the press conference as "astounding" and "egregious." The
trial judge also took notice, later referring to the extensive publicity the
case received "in the wake of the Attorney General's remarkable press
conference announcing this indictment.""
The indictment itself contained almost no specific allegations that
BIF funded al Qaeda." Instead, the charges focused primarily on BIF's
diversion of charitable donations to fund Chechen and Bosnian fighters.
At the same time, the indictment highlighted Arnaout's historical
relationship with Bin Ladin and BIF's links to certain al Qaeda leaders,
including BIF's origins with LBI, the Saudi entity Batterjee created in
1987 in large part to support mujahideen then fighting the Soviets in
Afghanistan, and the handoff of nominal control of BIF from Batterjee to
Arnaout. The indictment described Amaout's history of supporting
armed jihad, including Arnaout's having worked in the 1980s for the
Mektab al Khidmat 46 and LBI to support various mujahideen-among
them, those under the command of Usama Bin Ladin.47
43. Attorney General John Ashcrofl, Remarks, Chicago, Ill. (Oct. 9, 2004) avail-
lable at www.usdog.gov.ag/speeches/2002/100902agremarksbifindictment.html (last
visited Apr. 1, 2004).
44. United States v. Arnaout, 02 CR 892 (Jan. 28, 2003) (unpublished court order)
(on file with author).
45. The government did not charge BIF with providing material support to a
designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in violation of 18 USC 2339, which
would seem like a logical charge had the government been able to prove that the BIF
funded al Qaeda after it was designated an FTO in 1999.
46. As discussed above, the Mekhtab al Khidemat was an organization primarily
operated by Sheik Abdullah Azzam and Usama Bin Ladin to provide logistical support to
the rnujahideen in Afghanistan.
47. Of course, Amaout's defenders point out that supporting bin Ladin in the 1980s
when he was fighting in a cause supported by the United States is hardly evidence of
supporting terrorism.
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The indictment charged Arnaout with racketeering conspiracy under
RICO, alleging that Arnaout, Batterjee, and others operated BIF as a
criminal enterprise and used the cover of a legitimate Islamic charity to
support armed jihadist combatants. The government contended that BIF
fraudulently solicited and obtained donations by falsely representing that
the funds would be used solely for humanitarian purposes, while
concealing that some of the donated funds were used to support armed
fighters engaged in violence overseas. Through these illicit diversions,
the indictment alleged, BIF provided a variety of military supplies,
including boots, uniforms, and communications equipment, as well as an
X-ray machine to fighters in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Chechnya. The
indictment alleged that the conspirators engaged in various acts to
conceal their support of armed militants and BIF's relationship to al
Qaeda and other extremists.
The indictment also alleged that Amaout and others provided
material support to "persons, groups and organizations engaged in
violent activities-including al Qaeda[.] 'A 8  The charge contains no
specific claims about providing funds to al Qaeda, although it alleges that
in 1998 Arnaout facilitated the travel of a key al Qaeda member into
Bosnia-Herzegovina and that a leading al Qaeda member served as a BIF
official in Chechnya.49 An additional count in the indictment charged
Arnaout with providing material support to persons engaged in violent
activity by supplying 2,900 pairs of steel-reinforced anti-mine boots to
Chechen fighters. The remaining counts charged Arnaout with money
laundering and fraud in connection with BIF's activities.
The government indictment drew heavily on the documents seized
from the BIF office in Bosnia that directly linked BIF and Amaout to the
formative period of al Qaeda. These links included (1) notes
summarizing meetings during which al Qaeda was founded in
Afghanistan in August 1988, and which specify the attendance of Usama
Bin Ladin at the original oath of allegiance (bayat) that prospective
members made to al Qaeda; (2) a list of wealthy mujahideen sponsors
from Saudi Arabia, including references to Bin Ladin and Batterjee; (3)
various documents showing Arnaout's substantial role in procuring
weapons for the mujahideen in the 1980s or early 1990s; and (4) a 1988
newspaper article showing a picture of Arnaout and Bin Ladin.
50
48. Second Superseding Indictment, count 2 (on file with author).
49. See discussion later in this chapter regarding OFAC designation of the BIF for
more detail on the key al Qaeda operative whose travel the BIF allegedly facilitated.
50. The government later put together this evidence and much more in an
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Arnaout initially pled not guilty to all charges and mounted a
vigorous legal defense. OFAC refused to license BIF to use its blocked
assets to pay for Arnaout's criminal defense on the grounds that BIF's
funds could not be used by Arnaout in his individual capacity. Although
Arnaout personally was not designated and could use whatever funds he
had to defend himself, the OFAC refusal impaired Arnaout's ability to
pay his counsel and caused considerable bitterness among his supporters.
OFAC Designations
Following its blocking of BIF's and GRF's assets pending
investigation, OFAC continued to try to develop the evidentiary case it
believed necessary to make permanent designations. Meanwhile, the
charities' finances were effectively frozen, with the exception of the
licenses discussed above. At least one senior Treasury official was
concerned about the potential length of a temporary blocking order. On
April 12, 2002, roughly four months after the blocking order was issued,
the Treasury General Counsel wrote to other senior Treasury officials
that "common fairness and principles of equity counsel that we impose a
reasonable end date on the duration of such orders." 51 On October 18,
2002, OFAC designated GRF a specially designated global terrorist
(SDGT) pursuant to Executive Order 13224, thereby freezing its assets
and blocking transactions with it. As a result, four days later, the United
Nations listed GRF as an organization belonging to or associated with al
Qaeda. BIF met the same fate, as a result of OFAC action on November
19 and UN action on November 21.
The OFAC designations of BIF and GRF relied on the material
gathered by the FBI during its pre-9/ 11 investigations and, in the case of
the former, on the materials obtained in the March 2002 search of BIF's
evidentiary proffer it submitted to the court in advance of trial.
51. Treasury Memorandum, April 12, 2002 (on file with author). The memo
proposed a six-month limit for discussion purposes, and offered a "clear
recommendation" that temporary blocking orders be pursued with "due diligence and an
anticipated end date." In May and June 2002, OFAC provided GRF and BIF,
respectively, with notice of its intent to designate them and provided them with time to
respond. The lengthy duration of the temporary designations resulted in part from
extensions of time requested by BIF and GRF. These requests were necessary, at least in
part, because OFAC continually added additional documents to the administrative record,
and BIF and GRF wanted time to review and respond to them before any permanent
designation was issued. In addition, BIF and GRF were only slowly getting access to
their own records, which the government had seized, and they wanted additional time to
use these records in their defense.
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Bosnian offices. In its official Statement of the Case that provides
support for the designation, OFAC traced BIF's founding by Batterjee
and "the close relationship between Amaout and Usama bin Ladin,
dating from the mid-1980s and continuing at least until the early
1990s."52 OFAC drew links between BIF and Bin Ladin by noting (1) in
1998, BIF provided direct logistical support for an al Qaeda member and
Bin Ladin lieutenant, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, to travel to Bosnia-
Herzegovina; 53 (2) telephone records linked BIF to Mohammed Loay
Bayazid, who had been implicated in al Qaeda's effort to obtain enriched
uranium; (3) in the early 1990s, BIF produced videotapes that eulogized
dead fighters, including two al Qaeda members; and (4) in the late 1990s,
a member of al Qaeda's Shura Council served as an officer in BIF's
Chechnya office. OFAC cited a number of ways in which BIF's
activities differed from its ostensible purpose (e.g., it altered its books to
make support for an injured Bosnian fighter appear as aid to an orphan),
the purchase of equipment for Chechen fighters, and the newspaper
article the FBI agents had found in the trash, in which someone had
highlighted the weaknesses in the U.S. defenses against bioterrorism.
As for GRF, OFAC's internal documents supporting the designation
spelled out its ties to al Qaeda leaders, including (1) evidence that GRF
provided $20,000 to a suspected al Qaeda fund-raiser in November 2001;
(2) the phone contacts between GRF's executive director and the
mujahideen leader associated with al Qaeda leadership; (3) the phone
contacts linking GRF to Wadi al Hage, UBL's personal secretary, who
was convicted in the United States for his role in the 1998 embassy
bombings; and (4) funds that GRF received from Mohammed Galeb
Kalaje Zouaydi, a suspected al Qaeda financier in Europe who was
arrested in Spain in 2002.
OFAC's unclassified Statement of the Case laid out the extensive
evidence indicating GRF's role in supporting jihad. This evidence
included the pictures of sophisticated communications equipment the
FBI had found in the trash, photographs ofjihadists both alive and dead,
and documents establishing GRF's enthusiastic support for armed jihad.
For example, a GRF pamphlet from 1995 stated, "God equated
martyrdom through JIHAD with supplying funds for the JIHAD effort.
52. OFAC BIF Statement of the Case (on file with author).
53. Salim was later indicted for conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals, an overt act that
included the 1998 embassy bombings. While in custody, he assaulted a corrections
officer, inflicting grievous and permanent injury. Testimony in the 2001 embassy
bombing trial also implicated Salim in al Qaeda's efforts to develop WMD.
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All contributions should be mailed to: GRF." Another GRF publication
stated that charitable funds "are disbursed for equipping the raiders, for
the. purchase of ammunition and food, and for [the mujahideen's]
transportation so that they can raise God the Almighty's word[;]... it is
likely the most important ... disbursement of Zakat in our times is on the
jihad for God's cause[.]" 54
OFAC's assertions and the resulting UN actions publicly designated
BIF and GRF as supporters of al Qaeda and effectively shut down these
operations around the world.
BIF and GRF Challenges to OFAC's Actions
GRF failed in its efforts to challenge OFAC's initial asset blocking
in court. On June 11, 2002, the court denied GRF's claim for an
injunction requiring the government to "unfreeze" its assets and return its
property. The court held that GRF was not entitled to an injunction
because it had failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of success on its
claims that the U.S. government had violated its constitutional rights or
the laws of the United States." GRF's appeal was denied, and the U.S.
Supreme Court refused to consider the case.56 Although its legal
challenge to the preliminary designation failed, GRF has continued to
litigate the issue of whether sufficient evidence existed to justify its
designation as an SDGT. As of this writing, that litigation is pending in
federal district court in Chicago.
BIF's challenge to having its assets blocked pending investigation
was stayed until the criminal case was resolved, and eventually it was
dismissed. BIF elected not to challenge OFAC's designation of it as an
SDGT. By that time, BIF was focused on the criminal issues, and, in any
event, it was clear that BIF was dead as an organization.
Counsel for BIF and GRF expressed great frustration with the
OFAC process, including the blocking of assets without any adversarial
process adjudicating culpability, their view that the process lacked
defined standards, their perception of OFAC's unresponsiveness to
attorney inquiries and licensing requests, the use of classified evidence
unavailable to the defense, and OFAC's reliance on evidence that would
not be admissible in a judicial proceeding. For example, BIF's counsel
54. OFAC GRF Statement of the Case (on file with author).
55. Global Relief Foundation v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 809 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
56. Global Relief Foundation v. O'Neill., 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002), cert denied,
124 S. Ct. 531 (2003).
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was stunned to see that the administrative record supporting BIF's
designation included newspaper articles and other rank hearsay. To BIF
and GRF's counsel, experienced lawyers steeped in the federal courts'
rules of evidence and due process, the OFAC designation process
seemed manifestly unfair. In response, OFAC points out that the courts
have upheld the process and standards it uses in designations, as well as
the use of classified information, news articles and other hearsay in
support of the designations. OFAC further maintains that its
administrative record fully supports the designations of BIF and GRF.
Vigorous Defense in the Criminal Case
Before his plea, Arnaout vigorously litigated the criminal charges
against him. As the case moved closer to trial, the government submitted
a lengthy statement of facts setting forth the historical evidence tying
Arnaout to Bin Ladin and al Qaeda. This proffer, which included
multiple voluminous appendixes, drew heavily on the documents seized
in Bosnia. The government did not provide specific evidence that BIF
funded al Qaeda.
Rather, it relied heavily on evidence that predated both BIF's
creation and Bin Ladin's having become an avowed enemy of the United
States.
Through his counsel, Arnaout asked the court to exclude all
evidence related to al Qaeda, Bin Ladin, or other terrorist groups. To
Arnaout, the government's case essentially boiled down to diverting
charitable funds to support Chechen and Bosnian fighters, and had
nothing to do with bin Ladin, terrorism, or al Qaeda. The proffer
demonstrated, he contended, that "the United States intends to try Enaam
Arnaout not for acts he committed in violation of United States laws, but
rather for associations he had over a decade ago, before he relocated to
this country, with people who were at the time America's allies but who
are now its enemies. 57 The court reserved ruling on the evidence until
trial, but in a ruling ominous to the government held that Arnaout
"persuasively argues that a significant amount of the government's...
proffer contains materials that are not relevant to him nor probative of
the charges in the indictment(s), but rather are highly prejudicial matters
suggesting guilt by association.,
58
57. Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Historical Events
(January 13, 2003) (on file with author).
58. Order, Jan. 30, 2003. Separately, the court rejected the government's proffer
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Conviction and Sentence
On the morning that trial was to commence, Amaout pled guilty to
one count of racketeering conspiracy for fraudulent diversion of
charitable donations to promote overseas combatants. He admitted that
BIF solicited donations by representing the money would be used to
provide humanitarian relief to needy civilians, while concealing "from
donors, potential donors, and federal and state governments in the United
States that a material portion of the donations received by BIF based on
BIF's misleading representations was being used to support fighters
overseas." 59 The supplies Arnaout admitted that he and others agreed to
provide included boots for fighters in Chechnya, boots, tents, uniforms
for soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and uniforms for a provisional but
unrecognized government in Chechnya. The court later determined that
the amount of funds diverted from humanitarian relief to support these
fighters totaled $315,624.60 Arnaout never admitted to supporting al
Qaeda or any other terrorist group. To the contrary, as the presiding
federal district court judge pointed out, "In its written plea agreement,
the government agreed to dismiss sensational and highly publicized
charges of providing material support to terrorists and terrorist
organizations.",
61
The court sentenced Arnaout to more than 11 years in prison, but
flatly rejected the government's request that it apply the sentencing
enhancement for crimes of terrorism, which would have mandated a 20-
year prison sentence. The court said plainly, "Arnaout does not stand
convicted of a terrorism offense. Nor does the record reflect that he
attempted, participated in, or conspired to commit any act of terrorism.' 62
Moreover, the court held that the offense to which Amaout pled guilty,
racketeering conspiracy, was not a crime of terrorism as defined by law.
The court further held that applying the enhancement would be improper
because the "government has not established that the Bosnian and
Chechen recipients of BIF aid were engaged in a federal crime of
terrorism, nor that Arnaout intended the donated boots, uniforms,
blankets, tents, x-ray machine, ambulances, nylon and walkie-talkies to
as insufficient to satisfy the hearsay exception for co-conspirator statements. U.S. v.
Amaout, No. 02 CR 892, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1635 at *1 (Feb. 4, 2003). This order
made it more difficult and riskier for the government to offer such statements at trial.
59. Plea Agreement at 4 (on file with author).
60. United States v. Arnaout, 282 F. Supp. 2d 838, 840 (N.D. III. 2003).
61. Id. at 843.
62. Id.
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be used to promote a federal crime of terrorism." 63 The court did
increase Arnaout's prison time on the grounds that he diverted
humanitarian aid from the destitute population BIF was aiding to armed
fighters. Both the government and Arnaout appealed the sentence.
Amaout challenged the court's enhancement of his sentence for diverting
funds from needy civilians, and the government challenged the refusal to
apply the terrorism enhancement. A decision is pending.
Although Arnaout pled guilty to a serious felony and received a
long prison sentence, many people in the Islamic and Arab communities
concluded that Arnaout had been vindicated of any charge of supporting
terrorism. They interpreted the judge's refusal to apply the terrorism
sentencing enhancement as a major defeat for the government. As Al
Jazeera told its online readers, "The U.S. government had hoped for a
high profile 'terrorism' conviction, but the judge said the case had not
been made.",64 The charge Arnaout pled to, although undeniably serious,
fell far short of what the judge derisively called "sensational and highly
publicized" charges of supporting terrorists, which the Attorney General
himself had announced with great fanfare. A BIF lawyer believes that
Arnaout's case, along with the shutdown of BIF, hurt and angered the
Muslim community in the Chicago area. She fears that the bad feelings
left by the case substantially reduce the likelihood of cooperation with
law enforcement in the future.
Senior FBI agents in the Chicago office, who devote substantial
effort to community outreach, agreed that the plea and the court's refusal
to sentence Arnaout as a terrorism offender led many in Chicago's large
Islamic community to see him as vindicated and to believe the
government unjustly targeted him for prosecution-"picking on a poor
guy" who is standing up for Muslims, as one agent described it.65 These
agents, as well as the case agents, agree that accepting a plea to a serious
RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act) charge was
the right decision, but believe a trial would have allowed the government
to lay out all its evidence against Arnaout in open court. They believe
the community then would have seen what the agents saw-that Arnaout
and BIF were supporting terrorism.
63. Id. at 845.
64. Available at http://english.aljazeera.net (last visited Dec. 31, 2003).
65. Commission Staff Interview.
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Status of the GRF Criminal Case
The government's criminal investigation of GRF included the
review of the voluminous documents and computer records seized from
the GRF office and interviews with GRF personnel. Despite this effort,
the government has to date filed no criminal charges against GRF or its
leadership, and any such charges appear increasingly unlikely. GRF
steadfastly denies any wrongdoing and its supporters view the
government's failure to follow the OFAC blocking with a criminal
indictment as a vindication of the organization. GRF's counsel contends
that GRF never provided a single dollar to fund terrorism and that the
government's evidence of suspicious links with terrorists all have
innocuous explanations. He asserts GRF is an entirely innocent victim of
the government's attempt to take some actions to respond to public panic
caused by 9/11.
The government never proved a criminal case against GRF fund-
raiser Haddad. Instead, Haddad was deported to his native Lebanon in
July 2003 after an immigration judge found him ineligible for asylum
because he was a security danger to the United States, a decision which
was affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals. The decision to
deport him rather than continue the criminal investigation was made in
Washington, without consultation with the Detroit case agent who had
investigated Haddad. Despite the findings of the immigration judge,
Haddad's deportation generated considerable sympathy for him and
condemnation of an alleged violation of his civil rights by the U.S.
government. The government contends that ample evidence
demonstrated that Haddad had significant terrorist ties and was a
substantial threat to the United States.66
Lessons of BIF/GRF
The agents and officials in these cases faced one of the most
important and difficult issues in the fight against al Qaeda and jihadist
fund-raising: there is a difference between troubling "links" to terrorists
and compelling evidence of supporting terrorists. This gives rise to a
further issue: how much information does the government need before it
can take action against a potential terrorist fund-raiser?
66. It is not our purpose to assess Haddad's culpability, but we recognize the
decision not to criminally prosecute him does not amount to an exoneration. A decision
about whether to prosecute an individual can turn on a number of factors other than his
guilt, including whether unclassified evidence is available to use in court against him.
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Law enforcement officials had concluded that both BIF and GRF
had substantial and very troubling links to al Qaeda and the international
jihadist movement. Government agents had little doubt that the
leadership of these organizations endorsed the ideology of armed jihad
and, in many cases, supported an extremist and jihadist ideology. Both
of these organizations raised large amounts of money in the United
States, which they sent overseas, often to or through people with jihadist
connections. When the money went overseas, it became virtually
untraceable, since it could be converted to cash and sent anywhere in the
world. Moreover, BIF, at least, was plainly funding armed jihadist
fighters.
But there is another side to the story. Despite these troubling links,
the investigation of BIF and GRF revealed little compelling evidence that
either of these charities actually provided financial support to al Qaeda-
at least after al Qaeda was designated a foreign terrorist organization in
1999. Indeed, despite unprecedented access to the U.S. and foreign
records of these organizations, one of the world's most experienced and
best terrorist prosecutors has not been able to make any criminal case
against GRF and resolved the investigation of BIF without a conviction
for support of terrorism. Although the OFAC action shut down BIF and
GRF, that victory came at considerable cost of negative public opinion in
the Muslim and Arab communities, who contend that the government's
destruction of these charities reflects bias and injustice with no
measurable gain to national security.
The cases of BIF and GRF reveal how fundamentally 9/11 changed
law enforcement and the approach of the U.S. government to those
suspected of financing terrorists. In the past, suspicions of terrorist
connections often resulted in further investigation but not action. The
FBI watched jihadist sympathizers send millions of dollars overseas
because they did not have a sense of urgency about disrupting the fund-
raising and, in any event, had no practical way to do so. The 9/11 attacks
changed everything. Suddenly, letting money potentially earmarked for
al Qaeda leave the United States became another potential mass casualty
attack. The government after 9/11 had both the will and the tools to stop
the money flow. Thus, the government targeted and destroyed BIF and
GRF in a way that was inconceivable on September 10.
But the question remains, was the destruction of BIF and GRF a
success? Did it enhance the security of the United States or was it a
feckless act that violated civil rights with no real gain in security? A
senior government official who led the government's efforts against
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terrorist financing from 9/11 until late 2003 believed the efforts against
the charities were less than a full success and, in fact, were a
disappointment because neither charity was publicly proved to support
terrorism. The former head of the FBI's Terrorist Financing Operations
Section believes that strong intelligence indicated GRF and BIF were
funding terrorism and, although the evidence for a strong criminal
terrorism case may have been lacking, the government succeeded in
disrupting terrorist fund-raising mechanisms. At the same time, he
believes the cases have not been successful from a public relations
perspective because there have been no terrorism-related convictions.
BIF and GRF still contend they never supported terrorism, and
decry the government's conduct as counterproductive and abusive. A
BIF lawyer said she understands the government's desire to take decisive
action after 9/11 but thinks in moving against BIF the government
overreached, lost sight of what the evidence showed, sought to graft
irrelevant, dated al Qaeda allegations onto a simple fraud case, and
ignored the rules of fairness and procedural safeguards that make our
system the best in the world. In her view, the U.S. government "needs to
be better than that," especially in times of crisis when our values are put
to the test.
Our purpose is not to try to resolve the question of whether BIF or
GRF actually provided funds to terrorists. We can, however, come to
some understanding about whether the government action against them
was justified. Reviewing the materials, classified and unclassified,
available to the government makes it clear that their concerns about BIF
and GRF were not baseless. There may not have been a smoking gun
proving that these entities funded terrorism, but the evidence of their
links to terrorists and jihadists is significant. Despite the charities'
humanitarian work, responsible U.S. officials understandably were
concerned about these organizations sending millions of dollars overseas,
given their demonstrable jihadist and terrorist ties. Moreover, Arnaout
has admitted to fraudulent conduct, which in and of itself constitutes a
serious felony, even though it does not prove he funded al Qaeda.
At the same time, the government's treatment of BIF and GRF
raises substantial civil liberty concerns. IEEPA's provision allowing
blocking "during the pendency of an investigation" is a powerful weapon
with potentially dangerous applications when applied to domestic
institutions. This provision lets the government shut down an
organization without any formal determination of wrongdoing. It
requires a single piece of paper, signed by a midlevel government
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official. Although in practice a number of agencies typically review and
agree to the action, there is no formal administrative process, let alone
any adjudication of guilt. Although this provision is necessary in rare
emergencies when the government must shut down a terrorist financier
before OFAC can marshal evidence to support a formal designation,
serious consideration should be given to placing a strict and short limit
on the duration of such a temporary blocking. A "temporary"
designation lasting 10 or 11 months, as in the BIF and GRF cases,
becomes hard to justify.
Using IEEPA at all against U.S. citizens and their organizations
raises potentially troubling civil liberties issues, although to date the
courts have rejected the constitutional challenges to IEEPA in this
context.6 7 As the Illinois charities cases demonstrate, IEEPA allows the
freezing of an organization's assets and its designation as an SDGT
before any adjudication of culpability by a court. The administrative
record needed to justify a designation can include newspaper articles and
other hearsay normally deemed too unreliable for a court of law. A
designated entity can challenge the designation in court, but its chances
of success are limited. The legal standard for overturning the designation
is favorable to the government, and the government can rely on classified
evidence that it shows to the judge but not defense counsel, depriving the
designated entity of the usual right to confront the evidence against it.
Still, because of the difficulties of prosecuting complex terrorist-
financing cases the government may at times face the very difficult
choice of designating a U.S. person or doing nothing while dollars flow
68
overseas to potential terrorists.
Finally, we need to keep BIF and GRF in mind as we evaluate the
efforts (or lack of efforts) of our allies as they respond to intelligence
67. As noted above, the GRF challenge to IEEPA's constitutionality failed in court.
See also Holy Land Found. For Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C.
2002) (upholding use of IEEPA against purported charity accused of funding terrorism).
68. The IEEPA process gives the designated person fewer rights than in the
somewhat analogous circumstance of civil forfeiture, in which the government seeks to
take (as opposed to freeze) property that it claims was derived from or used to commit
specific crimes or unlawful acts. In seeking forfeiture where no crime is charged, the
government must file a civil lawsuit and bear the burden of proof by a preponderance of
the evidence (the standard used in most civil cases) that the property in question is
forfeitable. The defendant gets the same type of discovery of the evidence available to
any other litigant, such as taking sworn depositions and obtaining documents. Moreover,
the defendant has the right to avoid forfeiture by demonstrating that he is an innocent
owner, that is, he obtained or possessed the property in question without knowing its
illegal character or nature.
2005]
69
PACE LAWREVIEW
concerning persons allegedly financing terrorism. Several former
government officials have criticized the Saudi government for its failure
to prosecute individuals for financing terrorism. As one put it, Saudi
Arabia needs a "Martha Stewart"-a high-profile donor whose
prosecution can serve as deterrent to others. Much of the frustration with
the Saudis results from their apparent lack of will to prosecute criminally
those persons who U.S. intelligence indicates are raising money for al
Qaeda. Although willing to take other actions based on the
intelligence-such as removing someone from a sensitive position or
shutting down a charity-the Saudis have failed to impose criminal
punishment on any high-profile donor. BIF and GRF should remind us
that terrorist links and evidence of terrorist funding are far different
things. Saudi Arabia and other countries certainly have at times been
recalcitrant in seeking to hold known terrorist fund-raisers accountable
for their actions. But in criticizing them, we should remember that in
BIF and GRF, the total political will, prosecutorial and investigative
talent, and resources of the U.S. government have so far failed to secure
a single terrorist-related conviction.
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Exhibit E
Comments In Response To Internal Revenue Service
Announcement 2003-29, 2003-20 I.R.B. 928
Regarding International Grant -Making And
International Activities By Domestic 501(C)(3)
Organizations
In Announcement 2003-29, 2003-20 I.R.B. 928 (May 19, 2003), the
Internal Revenue Service requested public comment on how it might
clarify the existing requirements that section 501(c)(3) organizations
must meet with respect to international grant-making and other
international activities.
The following comments are the individual views of the members of
the Section of Taxation who prepared them and do not represent the
position of the American Bar Association or the Section of Taxation.
These comments were prepared by individual members of the
Committee on Exempt Organizations of the Section of Taxation.
Principal responsibility was exercised by Betsy Buchalter Adler and
Victoria Bjorklund. Substantive contributions were made by Boyd Black,
David Chernoff, Deirdre Dessingue, Gina Fields, Lisa Johnsen, and
Erich Kennedy. The Comments were reviewed by Carolyn Osteen of the
Section's Committee on Government Submissions, who also serves as
the Council Director for the Committee on Exempt Organizations.
Although many of the members of the Section of Taxation who
participated in preparing these Comments have clients who would be
affected by the federal tax principles addressed by these Comments or
have advised clients on the application of such principles, no such
member (or the firm or organization to which such member belongs) has
been engaged by a client to make a government submission with respect
to, or otherwise to influence the development or outcome of, the specific
subject matter of these comments.
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Contact Persons:
Betsy Buchalter Adler
Silk, Adler & Colvin
235 Montgomery Street, Suite 1220
San Francisco, California 94104
(415) 421-7555 (phone)
(415) 421-0712 (fax)
bba@silklaw.com
Victoria B. Bjorklund
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett
425 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10017
(212) 455-2875 (phone)
(212) 455-2502 (fax)
vbjorklund@stblaw.com
Date: July 18, 2003
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